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THE TERRIBLE TOUSAS:
OPINIONS TEST THE PATIENCE OF CORPORATE LENDING
PRACTICES
Jessica D. Gabel*
INTRODUCTION
Another bankrupt company hardly makes news in this economy; a case
built on liens, loans, and lawsuits does not strike a chord of the extraordinary.
The bankruptcy case of troubled homebuilder TOUSA, Inc. ("TOUSA") ,
however, is not one for the mundane. The case itself is a testament to the
economic crisis that has gripped the country since 2007. Indeed, the facts-
methodically analyzed under a judicial microscope-percolated from the
unprecedented burst of the housing bubble. TOUSA (the parent corporation)
entered into a rather complicated financing arrangement to fund a litigation
settlement stemming from a failed joint venture.2 Under the settlement
agreement, TOUSA agreed to pay the various joint-venture lenders more than
$421 million. In order to finance the settlement, TOUSA obtained a $200
million first-lien facility 3 and a $300 million second-lien facility from a group
of new lenders.4 TOUSA's subsidiaries served as co-borrowers (with their
parent) under the new loan agreements despite the fact that they were not
* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. J.D., University of Miami
School of Law; B.S., University of Central Florida. Clerk, the Honorable Peter T. Fay, Circuit Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The author would like to thank the dedicated students
behind the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal for their patience and support in the completion of this
"late-breaking" article. A great thanks also is owed to my colleague, J. Haskell Murray, for his ongoing advice
as to the intricacies of Delaware corporate law. My research assistants, Andrew Fleischman and Kimberly
Reeves, should be commended for their short-notice yet thorough research and editing. And last, my thanks to
Stephen Andrade (J.D., 2011, University of Miami School of Law) for his extensive contribution in the
research and development of the factual background and legal conclusions in the TOUSA bankruptcy court
decision.
1 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA, Inc. v. Citicorp N. Am. Inc. (In re TOUSA, Inc.),
422 BR. 783 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) [hereinafter TOUSA I].
2 Id. at 786-87.
3 Typically, the first-lien debt facility is generally a working capital loan that consists of a revolving-
loan facility, sometimes paired with a term loan. First-lien lenders generally require a first-priority lien on the
borrower's assets that puts them ahead of any other creditors on the borrower's assets. Id. at 789. Second-lien
lenders are next in line after the first-lien lenders. Jd.
4 Id. at 789.
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defendants to the joint-venture litigation.5 TOUSA and the subsidiaries (the
"Conveying Subsidiaries") secured the new financing with a lien on
substantially all of their assets, and the financing closed on July 31, 2007.6
Had this been an ordinary company obtaining financing in ordinary times,
probably little else would have come of this arrangement. But TOUSA was a
homebuilder, and this massive transaction closed just weeks before the housing
bubble began to implode in 2007. By January 2008, TOUSA and most of its
subsidiaries had filed for bankruptcy. 7  Shortly thereafter, the TOUSA
Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "Committee") initiated a lawsuit to
"claw back" 8 the loan proceeds related to the joint-venture settlement. In July
2009, Judge John Olson presided over a thirteen-day trial in the bankruptcy
court for the Southern District of Florida. In October 2009, he released his 182-
page opinion, concluding that: (1) the Conveying Subsidiaries were insolvent
both before and after the closing of the joint-venture settlement, which; (2) left
the Conveying Subsidiaries with unreasonably small capital; and (3) did not
provide those subsidiaries with reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
incurring the obligations and granting the liens.
9
In addition, the court noted that a savings clause built into the financing
agreement and aimed at insulating the lenders from subsequent fraudulent-
transfer actions was invalid and provided no protection to the new lenders that
had received first and second liens on the Conveying Subsidiaries' assets (the
"New Lenders"). 1 The opinion also contained a meticulous discussion of the
5 [d. at 787.
6 1d. at 789.
7 [d. at 801. Although the cases were jointly administered for convenience, the bankruptcies of the
individual entries were not substantively consolidated. See generally TOUSA . Substantive consolidation
"treats separate legal entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative assets
and liabilities." In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005).
8 Id. at 787. In bankruptcy cases, the power to recover property for the estate is vested in either the
trustee or, in chapter II cases, the debtor-in-possession. II U.S.C. § 548 (2006). In chapter II business
bankruptcies, the bankrupt company is referred to the debtor in possession as it attempts to reorganize its
debts. Jd. § 101(1). Consequently, the debtor-in-possession (as represented by counsel) may initiate an
avoidance action. The debtor-in-possession is not omnipotent, however. If the debtor-in-possession exhibits
"fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross management," a trustee may be appointed to replace the debtor-in-
possession. Id. § 1104(a)(1). Additionally, the bankruptcy court may allow the committee of unsecured
creditors to pursue actions on behalf of the bankrupt estate since any recovery maximizes the amount of assets
available to the general creditor pool. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp.
ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 554 (3d Cir. 2003) (permitting the committee of creditors
to pursue a derivative suit on behalf of the estate), see alsoi l U.S.C. §1109(b).
9 [d. at 786.
0 Id. at 863-64.
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expert testimony in the case and the events surrounding the decline and near-
epic failure of the real estate market during the time that the transaction took
place." Consequently, the court avoided the obligations incurred and the liens
granted by the Conveying Subsidiaries and required the joint-venture lenders
to return more than $400 million of the loan proceeds that they had received in
the settlement of the joint-venture litigation. ' 2
Various commentaries (from scholars and practitioners to a cadre of
lending groups) cast the opinion as radical and overreaching in most, if not all,
respects. 13 Predictably, the old and New Lenders appealed to the District Court
for Southern District of Florida. 14 Because of the various defendants involved,
and a voluminous record, the District Court split the issues among two judges
and heard oral argument in a joint session. Judge Alan Gold handled the appeal
relating to the old lenders (who were ordered to disgorge the $421 million in
joint-venture settlement proceeds), while another appeal (involving the New
Lenders who financed the settlement) was directed to Judge Adalberto
Jordan. 15
While some expected Judges Jordan and Gold to issue their opinions
simultaneously, in February 2011, Judge Gold released the first in what is
likely to be a series of TOUSA appellate opinions. The result was nearly (if not
equally) as shocking as TOUSA I Judge Gold's ruling ("TOUSA IT'), reversed
the bankruptcy court on every major issue, and, in a rather extraordinary
procedural punch, quashed the bankruptcy court's opinion instead of
11 [d. at 790-839.
12 Id. at 887.
13 Jo Ann J. Brighton, TOUSA: Do Lenders Have the Responsibility to Protect Borrowers From Their
Own Bad Judgment?, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 2010, at 18, 18 Arthur F. Coon and Kristin B. Peer, The
TOUSA, Inc. Bankruptcy Decision: Anatomy and Implications of a Landmark Creditors Rights Case, 1, http:/
www.clta.org/fbr-members/LegalCenter/article tousa-MillerStarr 2010.pdf
14 The Southern District of Florida takes a unique approach to bankruptcy appeals. The district court has
limited the number of district court judges presiding over bankruptcy appeals to three judges. This approach
effectively created a mini-Bankruptcy Appellate Panel to "ensure that the judge hearing the appeal will have
some interest and experience in reviewing bankruptcy appeals." Jessica D. Gabel and Samuel R Maizel,
Bankruptcy Appeals Manual: Winning Your Bankruptcy Appeal, Second Edition, AM. BANKR. INST., 2010, at
143.
15 Besides the fraudulent transfer claims, the Committee also brought claims against the first- and
second-lien term lenders to avoid certain tax refunds as unlawful preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547. All
appeals relating to the first- and second-lien term lenders on appeal were before Judge Jordan. See In re
TOUSA, Inc., No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *15 n.33 (SD. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011) rev'g in
part TOUSA 1, 422 B.R 783 (Bankr. S.D Fla. 2009) [hereinafter TOUSA 1/]. A separate appeal from a
different underlying bankruptcy proceeding was transferred to Judge Federico Moreno because it involves
"distinct legal questions of Delaware law on the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors." Id. at *3.
2011]
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remanding the case back to the bankruptcy court to enter new factual and legal
findings consistent with the District Court opinion. 16 In his ruling, Judge Gold
also harshly criticized the bankruptcy court for adopting many of the
Committee's post-trial submissions in the TOUSA I opinion.
17
This Article examines the two decisions (TOUSA I and TOUSA I) for their
legal analyses and macro-lending 18  implications. It traces the factual
background of the case, compares and contrasts the legal reasoning behind the
opinions, and it also considers the case's inevitable turn in the 11th Circuit. 19
I. FROM BOOM TO BUST TO BANKRUPTCY
A. The Overview
TOUSA and its subsidiaries designed, constructed, marketed, and sold
residential real estate developments and the homes eventually built within
those developments. The sequence of events that preceded TOUSA's
bankruptcy began in June 2005. 21 In short, Homes LP (a wholly-owned
subsidiary of TOUSA) formed a joint venture with a third party to acquire
certain homebuilding assets in Florida (the "Transeastern Joint Venture"). 22 To
finance the acquisition, a group of lenders (the "Transeastern Lenders") funded
approximately $560 million to the joint venture, and TOUSA provided a
carveout and completion guarantee of the obligations under the Transeastern
loan.23 Unfortunately, the Transeastern Joint Venture proved to be a losing
proposition. As 2006 drew to a close, the Transeastern Lenders sued both the
joint venture and TOUSA for defaulting under the credit agreement. The
16 [d. at *52.
17 Id. at *21-22.
18 Macro-lending is a term arrived at by the author and inspired by micro-lending organizations that loan
very small amounts of money to impoverished and resourced challenged entrepreneurs under the theory that
the tiny loan may lead to a successful business and repayment of that debt. The loan recipients are often
referred to as "fledgling" entrepreneurs because of the sink-or-swim nature of small business ideas. See, e.g.,
THE HORIZON FOUNDATION, Sustaining Charitable Projects Thru Microlending, http://www.
horizonsfoundation.com/micro-lending.html (last visited on Feb. 20, 2011 ). In contrast, macro-lending features
large-scale loans to struggling businesses (more akin to distressed lending) that function to rebound the
company and sometimes its industry at a macro-economic level. Thus, macro-lending situations include loans
to carmakers to stave off the collapse of the Detroit automotive industry and homebuilders like TOUSA to
soften the burst of the housing bubble.
19 A very anticipated appeal among bankruptcy scholars.
20 TOUSA 1 422 BR. 783, 787 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
21 Id. at 787-88.
22 [d. at 787
2, Id. at 788.
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Transeastern Lenders sought repayment of the Transeastern loans and
attempted to enforce the guarantees provided by TOUSA.
24
With the prospect of costly litigation looming, the parties agreed to a
settlement in early 2007. The terms of the settlement included a payment of
more than $420 million to the Transeastern Lenders.25 To finance this
arrangement in June 2007, TOUSA entered into $500 million first lien and
second credit facilities in with the New Lenders. 26 As a condition precedent to
the settlement, TOUSA pledged substantially all of its assets and required its
subsidiaries to provide secured guarantees for the first- and second-lien
27
obligations.
An important piece to the subsequent bankruptcy litigation rested on the
fact that none of the Conveying Subsidiaries had been partners in the
Transeastern Joint Venture, nor had they guaranteed the Transeastern Joint
Venture's debt to the Transeastern Lenders.28 Yet, these entities became
obligated for the payment of these new loans and granted liens on substantially
all of their assets to fund the settlement.
29
By January 2008, less than six months after the settlement, TOUSA and its
subsidiaries filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Southern District
of Florida.30 Acting on behalf of TOUSA's estate, the Committee instituted an
adversary proceeding against the New Lenders to avoid the $500 million in
liens granted by TOUSA's subsidiaries as fraudulent transfers. 31 The
Committee also sued all the lenders who participated in the settlement
financing, including the Transeastern Lenders who received the proceeds of the
transaction.
32
Judge Olson presided over a relatively lengthy trial.33 In an extensive
opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that the settlement proceeds that
24 Id. at 789.
25 [d. at 786.
26 Id. at 786-87.
27 Id. at 789-90.
28 [d. at 787. Equally important is the fact that the bankruptcies of the TOUSA entities for various
reasons-were not substantively consolidated.
29 [d. at 789 90.
30 Id. at 787.
3 Id. at 786.
32 [d. at 787.
" Id. at 786.
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repaying the Transeastern Lenders34 and the underlying liens securing the
proceeds amounted to constructive fraudulent transfers. The bankruptcy court
concluded that TOUSA was insolvent prior to the July 31 Transaction, and that
the Transeastern Lenders failed to investigate diligently TOUSA solvency
before accepting the settlement proceeds. 35 The court further found, in dicta,
that the "savings clauses" contained in the agreements-intended to shield the
lenders from claims that the July 31 Transaction sunk TOUSA into
insolvency-were invalid; consequently, the lenders were unable to seek the
shelter of their contractual safe harbors.
36
B. The Boom
In its heyday, TOUSA grew rapidly through a series of acquisitions.37 By
the end of 2004, TOUSA was the thirteenth largest homebuilder in the United
States. 38 TOUSA and its subsidiaries expanded their portfolios beyond the
design, building, and marketing of residential real estate, and moved into title
insurance and mortgage brokerage services. 39 After 2004, to facilitate its rapid
34 The Transeastem Lenders consisted of a squadron of credit lenders who engineered the financing of
the Joint Venture including: 3V Capital Master Fund Ltd., Atascosa Investments, LLC; Aurum CLO 2002-1
Ltd.: Bank of America, N.A.; Bear Stearns Investment Products Inc.: Black Diamond CLO 2005-1; Burnet
Partners, LLC; Centurion CDO 10, Ltd., Centurion CDO 8, Limited, Centurion CDO 9, Ltd., Centurion CDO
II, Ltd: Centurion CDO VI, Ltd: Centurion CDO VII, Ltd.: Centurion CDO XI, Ltd.; Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas, Distressed High Yield Trading Ops. Fund Ltd, Eaton Vance Credit Opportunities Fund,
Eaton Vance Floating-Rate Income Trust: Eaton Vance Grayson & Co.; Eaton Vance Limited Duration
Income Fund; Eaton Vance Senior Debt Portfolio: Eaton Vance Senior Floating-Rate Trust Eaton Vance
Senior Income Trust, Eaton Vance VT Floating-Rate Income Fund, Farallon Capital Institutional Partners 11,
L.P.; Farallon Capital Institutional Partners III, L.P.; Farallon Capital Institutional Partners, L.P.: Farallon
Capital Offshore Investors 11, L.P. Farallon Capital Offshore Investors, Inc.; Farallon Capital Partners, L.P.;
Flagship CLO I1L Flagship CLO IV: Flagship CLO V Gleneagles CLO Ltd; Goldman Sachs Credit Partners,
L.P., Grand Central Asset Trust, CED Series, Grand Central Asset Trust, LD Series, Grand Central Asset
Trust, SOH Series, Hartford Mutual Funds, Inc., on behalf of The Hartford Floating Rate Fund by Hartford
Investment Management Company, their Sub- Advisor; Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd.: Highland
Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Highland Floating Rate Advantage Fund, Highland Floating Rate LLC;
Highland Legacy Limited; Highland Ofishore Partners, L.P.: Jasper CLO, Ltd.; JPMorganChase Bank, N.A.:
Liberty CLO, Ltd., LL Blue Marlin Funding LLC; Loan Funding VII LLC; Merrill Lynch Credit Products,
LLC: Ocean Bank; The Quadrangle Master Funding Ltd.; Riversource Floating Rate Fund: Rockwall CDO,
Ltd.: Sequils-Centurion V, Ltd.; Silver Oak Capital, LLC; Stedman CBNA Loan Funding LLC: The Foothills
Group, Inc.; Tinicum Partners, L.P.; Van Kampen Dynamic Credit Opportunities Fund Van Kampen Senior
Income Trust; Van Kampen Senior Loan Fund; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. See TOUSA If, No. 10-60017-
CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *7 n.16 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
35 TOUSA , 422 B.R 783, 858, 872 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
36 Id. at 863-64.
37 Id. at 787.
38 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at I.
39 id.
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growth, TOUSA took on more than $1 billion of unsecured bond debt.40
TOUSA positioned itself as the obligor on the bond debt, and many of its
subsidiaries accepted joint and several liability as guarantors.4 1 Those
bondholders acquired a senior right to payment from the assets of all of these
subsidiaries.42 As of July 31, 2007 (the closing date of the settlement), the
principal outstanding on the bonds approximated $1.061 billion.
43
C. The Beginning of the Bust
In June 2005, TOUSA announced plans to acquire Transeastern Properties,
Inc.44 The parties structured the acquisition as a joint venture between TOUSA
Homes LP, a wholly-owned TOUSA subsidiary, and other entities owned by
Transeastern's two majority shareholders, Arthur and Edward Falcone
("Falcone Entities"). 45 After the Transeastern acquisition was completed in
August 1, 2005, TOUSA became the eleventh largest homebuilder in the
United States.
46
TOUSA and the Falcone Entities funded the Transeastern Joint Venture
with $675 million of third-party debt capacity, a $20 million subordinated loan
from Homes LP, and $165 million of equity, of which Homes LP contributed
$90 million in cash and the Falcone Entities contributed $75 million in
property.47 In addition, a set of carve out guarantees required TOUSA, Homes
LP, and the Falcone Entities to indemnify the lenders for any losses incurred
due to fraud, material misrepresentation, misappropriation of funds, improper
use of insurance proceeds, internal misconduct or waste with respect to the
collateral, and/or the borrowers' failure to maintain insurance or pay taxes. 48
40 TOUSA I, 422 BR. at 787.
41 Id. at 787-88.
42 Id. at 787.
43 [id.
44 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at 1.
45 [id.
46 Id. at 2.
47 TOUSA J, 422 B.R. at 788. In connection with the Transeastern credit agreements, the Transeastern
lenders also obtained three unsecured completion guaranties from TOUSA and Holmes LP, as well as three
unsecured carve-out guaranties from TOUSA, Holmes LP, and the Falcone entities. Id. at 788.
48 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at 2 n.4 ("The Completion Guarantees made TOUSA and Homes LP
liable to pay certain project costs of development already in process at the time of the acquisition, in the event
the Transeastern JV failed to do so. Under this guarantee, TOUSA and Homes LP were also liable for
satisfaction of any mechanics' liens."). A carve out guaranty (also known as a "bad boy" guaranty) is
employed where a loan is non-recourse except on occurrence of the specified events the lender wishes to
discourage-such as bankruptcy, false representations, or financial reporting, the wrongful transfer of
collateral, or misappropriation of rents, security deposits, reserve accounts or insurance proceeds. Rick L.
2011]
EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL
Although the Transeastern Joint Venture initially showed promise, the
momentum of a housing market in freefall would eventually swallow any
success.49 From decreased buyer demand to devastating storms in the Gulf
region, the housing industry began to crumble, and TOUSA could not escape
the coming chaos.50 In May 2006, TOUSA announced that its previous
projections for Transeastern deliveries that year should be decreased by
approximately 20%. 51 In June 2006, TOUSA also announced that its 2006
second-quarter sales would be down 25-40% as compared to the second-
quarter 2005 sales.52 Finally, TOUSA announced revised, lower annual-net-
income guidance for 2006 and indicated that it continued to expect difficult
market conditions for the foreseeable future.
53
On a separate course of disaster, customers began to cancel their sales
contracts. With the rising number of canceled contracts, Transeastern compiled
new financial projections in September 2006. 54 The newly revised projections
indicated that future sales and deliveries could not support the Transeastern
Joint Venture's existing capital structure and that the joint venture would soon
be in default of the Transeastern Loans.55 Deutsche Bank, the Administrative
Agent for the Transeastern Lenders, sent letters dated October 31, 2006, and
November 1, 2006, to TOUSA and Homes LP demanding payment under the
Transeastern Guaranties. 56 In November 2006, the Transeastern Joint
Venture's management concluded that the joint venture would not have the
ability to continue as a going concern under its current debt structure and
announced that it would write off $143.6 million of its investment in the
Transeastern Joint Venture.
57
On November 28, 2006, TOUSA and Homes LP filed a complaint against
Deutsche Bank in Broward County, Florida, seeking a declaratory judgment
Knuth, The Commercial Loan Guaranty-Types & Techniques, UTAH BAR J., (July 16, 2008), http:/webster.
utahbar.org/barjoumal/2008/07/the commercial loan guaranty t.html.
49 TOUSA , 422 B.R.at 783, 788.
50 Id, see, e.g., Long-Term Impact of Katrina Seen on Housing, Note Experts, KITCHEN & BATH DESIGN
NEWS, (Nov. I, 2005), http://www.allbusiness.com/construction/construction-materials-components/
10577901 I.html.
51 Disclosure Statement of the Debtor TOUSA, Inc. at 32, TOUSA 1, 422 B.R 783 (Banir. S.D. Fla. 2009)
[hereinafter "TOUSA Disclosure Statement"].
52 id.
53 [id.
54 id.
55 id
56 TOUSA , 422 B.R 783, 788 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 2009).
57 id
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that their liability had not been triggered under the completion guarantees or
the carve-out guarantees. 58 For its part, Deutsche Bank brought its own suit
against TOUSA and Homes LP in New York state court, in December 2006,
claiming breaches of the carve-out guarantees and completion guarantees
against TOUSA and Homes LP.59
D. The July 31 Transaction
By Spring 2007, the parties to the dueling Transeastern Joint Venture
litigations (the Florida declaratory action and the NY breach of contract action)
entered global settlement discussions. In June 2007, TOUSA publicly
announced that it had reached an agreement with Deutsche Bank to settle all
disputes regarding its liability for the failed Transeastern Joint Venture. 61 The
global settlement also resolved certain claims between TOUSA and the
Falcone Entities.62 The settlement agreement was finalized and executed on
July 31, 2007 (the "July 31 Transaction"). 63
In order to finance this settlement, TOUSA amended its existing $800
million revolver with Citicorp by reducing the available credit to $700
64million. This enabled TOUSA to obtain two new secured loans, one for $200
million and one for $300 million.65 The term loan credit agreements for each
58 [I. at 789.
59 Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Technical Olympic USA, Inc. and TOUSA Homes LP, No.
06/604118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007); Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. v. Technical Olympic USA, Inc.,
EH/Transeastem, LLC, and TE/TOUSA Senior, LLC, No. 600974/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007).
60 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at 2.
61 TOUSA Disclosure Statement, supra note 51, at 34 ("Under the Global Settlement, the senior
Transeastern lenders received $422.8 million in cash including interest and the Senior and Junior Mezzanine
Debt was satisfied for $153.75 million (plus legal fees and expenses) in the form of the following
consideration: Subordinated Notes ($20 million); convertible preferred stock (with a liquidation preference of
$117.5 million), and warrants to purchase common stock (valued at $16.25 million). In exchange, Deutsche
Bank released TOUSA and Homes LP from all claims relating to the Transeastern JV, including all claims
relating to the carve out and completion guarantees. Certain of the Debtors also acquired all of the assets of the
Transeastern JV as part of the settlement.
62 d. ("[T]he parties agreed that Falcone would give up its equity interest in the Transeastem JV, and the
Transeastern JV would surrender its interest in most of its optioned properties owned by Falcone. In addition,
TOUSA agreed to indemnify Falcone for any third party claims relating to the Carve-Out Guarantees and
release Falcone from a covenant not to compete.").
63 TOUSA , 422 BR. at 789.
64 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at 3.
65 Id. In connection with the amended revolver and new loans, TOUSA and its subsidiary co-borrowers
were required to pledge substantially all of their assets as security, and they mortgaged substantially all of their
homebuilding assets in favor of Citicorp and the other lenders. The result was that while TOUSA's
2011]
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loan required, among other things, that the funds be used to pay the
66Transeastern Lenders. The transaction's similarity to the mythological
character Hydra (multiple heads at odds with each other) is in part the source
of the diametric conflict between TO USA I and TO USA II.
After settling the Transeastern Joint Venture lawsuits, TOUSA poured itsS 67
efforts and resources into its core homebuilding business. The economy,
however, had already begun to fracture and in the third quarter of 2007,
TOUSA was unable to warrant its solvency as required under the terms of the
amended revolver.68 On November 15, 2007, the New York Stock Exchange
suspended TOUSA's listing for failure to maintain common stock standard
listing requirements.
69
E. The Bankruptcy
By the end of January, 2008, the continued decline in the homebuilding
industry, together with growing liquidity concerns, led TOUSA and most of its
subsidiaries to file a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 70 On July 14, 2008, the Committee filed its adversary
proceeding. 71 The Committee sought to avoid the liens and obligations in the
amount of $500 million granted by the Conveying Subsidiaries to the New
Lenders less than 6 months before their bankruptcy filings in January 2008.
72
The Committee also sought to recover from the Transeastern Lenders the $420
million paid in settlement proceeds, as fraudulent transfers.
73
In a telling manner of things to come, the trial took place in Miami during
thirteen sweltering days in July and August 2009. It consisted of nearly
twenty live witnesses, fifty percipient witness deposition transcripts, numerous
subsidiaries themselves had no liability to the Transeastern Lenders, all of their assets were nonetheless
pledged to secure the new terra loans funding the settlement. Id.
66 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. at 789.
67 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at 4.
68 [d. Often, revolving lines of credit require that a company maintain its solvency (i.e., balance of assets
to liabilities) at a certain level and provide verification of such to the lender.
69 id.
70 Id.; see also TOUSA Disclosure Statement, supra note 51, at 35.
71 TOUSA Disclosure Statement, supra note 51, at 35.
72 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R 783, 789 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 2009).
7 Id. The Committee also sought to avoid as preferential the grant of a security interest in a $207 million
tax refund to lenders of the new loans used to finance the July 31 transaction. The appeal related to the
preference action under I I U.S.C. § 547(c).
74 Coon and Peer, supra note 13, at 4
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expert witness deposition transcripts, and thousands of pages of exhibits. 75 On
October 13, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court issued its 182-page opinion.
76
F. The Opinion
TOUSA I first concluded that the Conveying Subsidiaries were insolvent at
the time of the July 31 Transaction, that the transaction rendered them even
more insolvent, with unreasonably small capital, and unable to pay their debts
as they matured.7 7 As a result, the liens were avoided as fraudulent transfers,
and the settlement proceeds were ordered to be recovered for the benefit of the
estate.78
In the end, Judge Olson found that $403 million of the $421 million paid to
Transeastern lenders was a fraudulent transfer and ordered that these funds be
disgorged. 79 He also ordered that all of the $500 million in liens granted by the
Conveying Subsidiaries be avoided. 80 Finally, he ordered the lenders to pay the
Committee's attorneys' fees and expenses and for the debtors' estate be
"reimbursed" for the decline in value of the assets upon which the avoided
liens had been granted. 81
G. The Appeal
The lenders appealed the bankruptcy court's decision as to its factual
findings and legal conclusions. 82 As explained in the introduction of this
Article, TOUSA II reversed and quashed the portion of TOUSA I's order
related to Transeastern Lenders. While the district court scorched and burned
the bankruptcy court's order, it arguably took the most offense with what it
75 id.
76 [id.
77 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. at 790.
78 [I. at 786. The court went on to hold that the interest in the tax refund given as security to the new loan
lenders was perfected within the preference period (I I U.S.C. § 547(b)), at the time when the debtors were
insolvent, and would enable the lenders to receive more than they would in a chapter 7 liquidation. Id. at 856.
Therefore, the security interest in the tax refund was also to be avoided, and those portions of it which were
paid out to the lenders as part of a cash collateral stipulation were ordered to be recovered. Id. at 786. The
court held that the pledged $207 million tax refund was an improper preference. Jd.
79 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at 6.
80 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. at 886.
81 Coon & Peer, supra note 13, at 6 7.
82 Id. at 7.
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characterized as the bankruptcy court's wholesale adoption of the Committee's
proposed findings8 3
Generally, on appeal, a bankruptcy court's findings of fact will be accorded
deference by the reviewing court. On the other hand, conclusions of law
receive de novo review.84 To disturb a holding, the appellate court must
conclude that the bankruptcy court's factual findings were "clearly
erroneous." 85 A finding is clearly erroneous "when the record lacks substantial
evidence to support the factual findings such that an appellate court's review of
the evidence results in a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
86
In TOUSA II, the district court quashed the bankruptcy court's order in an
absolute and final style. In its opinion the District Court chastised the
bankruptcy court for incorporating certain proposed findings of facts submitted
by the Committee, noting that the action amounts to "an abandonment of the
duty and the trust that has been placed in the judge."87 Some circuits take
exception to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review where the bankruptcy
court "merely adopt[s] in full" the prevailing party's version of the facts.
88
When those circumstances arise, the standard of review for findings of fact by
the bankruptcy court is one of "special scrutiny" rather than the more
deferential "clearly erroneous" standard.8 9
In the Eleventh Circuit, however, courts are less inclined to depart from the
"clearly erroneous" standard.90 The Supreme Court has adopted a view that
findings will not be rejected out-of-hand when they are the product of more
than just the judge's work. In fact, the findings will stand when supported by
evidence.9' On appeal, however, the district court covered its bases by
83 TOUSA H, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at* 17 (SD. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
84 Gabel & Maizel, supra note 14, at 50.
85 TOUSA I, 2011 WL 522008, at *20.
86 Id. (citations omitted).
87 [d. at *21 (quoting U.S. v. El Paso Nat'l Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, n.4 (1964)).
88 Gabel & Maizel, supra note 14, at 50 (citations omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, a bankruptcy court's
findings, if merely adopted in full from the findings of fact by the prevailing party, are subject to "special
scrutiny." Alvernaz Farms, Inc. v. Bank of Cal. ( In re T.H. Richards Processing Co.), 910 F.2d 639, 643 n. 2
(9th Cir. 1990) Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1385 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1984).
89 Gabel & Maizel, supra note 14, at 50.
90 Lykes Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 64 F.3d 630, 634 (1995) (concluding that the clear
error standard of review of factual findings does not change when district court adopts verbatim the findings of
one of the parties, but practice is strongly disapproved).
91 U. S. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964). The majority articulated that findings of
fact "though not the product of the workings of the district judge's mind, are tormally his; they are not to be
rejected out-of-hand, and they will stand if supported by evidence." Id. The dissent further elaborated that
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articulating at each turn that the bankruptcy court's findings were not
supported by the evidence. 92 Moreover, in an unfiltered fashion, the district
court hurled the specter of ethical misconduct by emphasizing that the
bankruptcy court's use of the Committee's proposed factual findings violated
established Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, in addition to
guidelines provided to new federal judges.93
The move to quash TOUSA I (as related to the Transeastern Lenders),
however, is one not only reserved for the most extraordinary of cases, but also
appears to be the rarest of resolutions. A review of bankruptcy appeals reveals
fewer than five reported decisions where an order was quashed. The more
common (and perhaps more defensible on appeal) approach is to remand the
case to the bankruptcy court.94 But given his determination as to the facts,
Judge Gold concluded that when the "record allows but one resolution of the
factual issues, remand is unnecessary." 95 It is difficult to imagine how the
requisite skepticism inherent in a review of factual findings that adopt those
suggested by a prevailing party could rise to the level of quashing an opinion
in total and border on judicial censure. After all, "every truth has two sides; it
is as well to look at both, before we commit ourselves to either." 96 That debate,
however, is better saved for the Eleventh Circuit, while the meatier questions
over "reasonably equivalent value," avoidability of transfers, and lender due
diligence are the primary focus of this Article.
"[flindings of fact should, of course, be the product of the conscientious and independent judgment of the
district judge. Nevertheless, if they are supported by evidence, they are not rendered suspect simply because
the trial court, as here, has accepted in toto the findings proposed by one side or the other." Id. at 662-63
(Harlan, J. dissenting).
92 TOUSA II, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *28 (SD. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
93 [d. at *21. Here, the district court cited to the perils of"ghostwriting" opinions, a caution famously
noted in In re Colony Square, Co., 819 F.2d 272, 274-76 (1lth Cir. 1987).
94 See, e.g,, In re Pardee, 218 BR. 916 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (affirming bankruptcy court's decision
despite harmless error on collateral issue).
9' TOUSA 11, 2011 WL 522008, at *22 (citations omitted).
96 Aesop, The Mile, in AESOP'S FABLES (620 560 BC). In addition, remand would be entirely possible
and appropriate especially since practice permits remand and reassignment to another judge. See United States
v. Remillong, 55 F.3d 572, 577 78 n. 12 (11 th Cir. 1995) (identifying three factors that inform a decision
whether to reassign a case upon remand: "(1) whether the original judge would have difficulty putting his
previous views and findings aside, (2) whether reassignment is appropriate to preserve the appearance of
justice; (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to the gains realized
from reassignment").
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11. ANATOMY OF THE FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
A. 1] US. C. 548-Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations
During the bankruptcy litigation, the Committee sought to avoid the
transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 548, which outlines when a transfer or
obligation incurred by the debtor will be considered fraudulent and gives the
trustee the power to avoid such transfers.97 Section 548 provides that
fraudulent transfers may be avoided if the trustee (or, in TOUSA's case, the
Committee) demonstrates that the transfer was either actually or constructively
fraudulent. Specifically, § 548(a)(1) states:
(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to
or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including any
obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment
contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or
within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the
debtor voluntarily or involuntarily
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the
debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)
(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and(ii)
(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred, or
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or
was about to engage in business or a transaction,
for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital;
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor
would incur, debts that would be beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured; or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of
an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for
97 TOUSA I, 422 B.R. 783, 787 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 2009).
9' 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2006) (actual fraud), id. § 548(a)(1)(B) (constructive fraud).
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the benefit of an insider, under an employment
contract and not in the ordinary course of
business.
99
The issues at trial centered on the two-prong test for "constructive fraud"
articulated in § 548(a)(1)(B), which is more difficult to prove than
§ 548(a)(1)(A)'s actual fraud provision. 10 In order to exercise these powers,
the Committee needed to prove, in relevant part, that the transfer at issue
involved a property interest of the debtor. 10 1 In TOUSA II, the court indirectly
noted that the Bankruptcy Code lacks a definition of "property," but thought
that TOUSA 's reliance on the dictionary definition of "property" was
misplaced. 102 Whether the transfer involves the property of the Debtor is a
finding of fact that is subject to review only for clear error (although the
district court here employed a more rigorous review). 13
For the court to hold the Transeastern Lenders liable for receiving the
settlement proceeds, the Conveying Subsidiaries needed to have an interest in
the $421 million. In TOUSA II, the district court reversed the bankruptcy
court's finding that the transfer involved the Conveying Subsidiaries' property
because it viewed those entities as having no control over the funds from the
outset. In TOUSA I, the Committee demonstrated that the transfer of settlement
proceeds involved property belonging to the Conveying Subsidiaries by a
preponderance of the evidence. 04 The bankruptcy court found that standard
satisfied based on evidence presented at trial. Nonetheless, reading TOUSA I
and TOUSA II side-by-side on the control issue demonstrates two different
conclusions drawn from substantially the same facts and even the same case
law.
99 Id. § 548(a)(1).
100 Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1206
(2010) (defining constructive fraud as debtor conduct that is objectively likely to make creditors worse of).
101 TOUSA If, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *23 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011) ("The
Transeastern Lenders correctly point out that Section 548 applies only to a transfer 'of an interest of the debtor
in property.' The threshold question under this provision is whether each transfer was in fact property of the
debtor. For purposes of Section 548, the fraudulent conveyance claimed against the Transeastern Lenders
applied only to "property" the Conveying Subsidiaries had in the New Loan proceeds which were transferred
by TOUSA to the Transeastern Lenders in settlement of the antecedent debt." (citations omitted)).
102 Id. at *31-32.
103 See In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 813 F.2d 1177, 1180 (l lth Cir. 1987) (implying that the
determination that funds are a debtor's property is a factual finding), see also In re Gutpelet, 137 F.3d 748,
752 (3d Cir. 1998) (subjecting "bankruptcy court's finding that the [d]ebtor had an interest in the [ ][p]roperty"
to review fbr clear error).
104 In re Am. Way Serv. Corp., 229 BR. 496, 525 (Bankr. S.D Fla. 1999).
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B. Diagnosing Control Issues
Both TOUSA I and TOUSA II devote a large amount of attention to the role
that control plays in finding a requisite property interest subject to a fraudulent
transfer action. Both opinions rely upon the Eleventh Circuit decision In re
Chase & Sanborn Corp.,105 but each interprets the import of that case
differently. In TOUSA I, the bankruptcy court rejected the Transeastern
Lenders' attempt to infer that control is "an essential element of any property
interest. ' ' 106 Noting the various examples of interests in property that do not
"encompass control of the disposition of the property," the bankruptcy court
found the Transeastern Lenders' arguments unpersuasive. 10 7 By contrast, the
district court found control to be a paramount consideration to the question of
property interest and criticized what it perceived to be the bankruptcy court's
decline down a slippery slope. This would force a broader control test to
negate the paradigmatic example of a fraudulent transfer, in which
the owner of an insolvent corporation transfers corporate funds to a
personal account for his personal use. In that situation, the owner,
rather than the corporation, may exercise de facto control over the
disbursement of the corporate funds to his own account, but no one
would suggest that the owner's control negates the corporation's
legal and equitable interest in the funds. 
108
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court concluded that the estates of the Conveying
Subsidiaries were diminished by the payments to the Transeastern Lenders
"because the Conveying Subsidiaries- which were not liable for any debt to
them-received no value from the release of the Senior Transeastern Lenders'
claims against others." 109
The bankruptcy court further observed that any "control" requirement
would run counter to the statutory definition of "transfer." 110 While "property"
is not defined in the Code, the term "transfer" encompasses a broad definition
105 Inre Chase &Sanborn Corp., 813 F.2dat 1180.
106 TOUSA , 422 B.R 783, 873 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 2009).
107 [d. at 873 74.
'08 TOUSA 11, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *24 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011). The
bankruptcy and district courts also disagreed on the application of the earmarking doctrine, which in practice is
a defense better suited to preference actions. The bankruptcy court explained that the earmarking doctrine was
inapplicable because the doctrine is "invoked when the transaction, viewed in its entirety, merely replaces one
creditor with another, and does not diminish the value of the estate." TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. at 874 n. 57 (citations
omitted).
109 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. at 844.
110 Id.
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that includes, "each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary
or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with (i) property; or (ii) an interest in
property." ''1 Moreover, the bankruptcy court emphasized that a fraudulent
transfer may occur irrespective of whether the debtor acts "voluntarily or
involuntarily."' 12 To the bankruptcy court, these definitions demonstrated that
the Conveying Subsidiaries could own an interest in the settlement proceeds
even if they had "no power to prevent some other party from transferring the
property."' 13
The Conveying Subsidiaries' control over the funds that went to the
Transeastern Lenders is necessary to avoid the transfer under § 548(a)(1)(B).
Simply put, a debtor cannot give away what it does not own; there would be no
transfer of a debtor's property. The district court vehemently disagreed with
this interpretation. It reversed, holding that the terms of the July 31 Transaction
and the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the settlement and related
loans were clear: (1) the proceeds were to be repaid to the Transeastern
Lenders, and (2) the Conveying Subsidiaries never had any control over the
proceeds the loans.1 4 Consequently, once the district court determined that the
Conveying Subsidiaries lacked any "interest" in such proceeds, then any
subsequent payment of loan proceeds to the Transeastern Lenders in
satisfaction of TOUSA's debt could not be a fraudulent transfer.115 In other
words, the district court found the easiest answer: if the Conveying
Subsidiaries had nothing to give, then they could expect nothing in return.
The district court billed the facts as "undisputed" evidence of no control. It
viewed the initial transfer as a transfer of liens from TOUSA (and the
Conveying Subsidiaries) to the New Lenders who then exercised full legal
control over the liens, thereby removing the Transeastern Lenders from the
equation. 16 This is an oversimplified conclusion, but by the same token, the
bankruptcy court perhaps overextended the largesse of the Conveying
Subsidiaries' control. The latter result may be as much a case of lopsided
pleading (an aggressive Committee asking for too much and an over-confident
lender assuming too much) as one of judicial overcorrection (a bankruptcy
court placing the parties back to where they were as if the July 31 Transaction
. I. d. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D) (2006)).
112 [d. (citing I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)).
" Id. at 783.
114 TOUSA 11, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *24-25 (SD. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
115 [d. at *25.
116 Id. at *24.
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had never existed). To have the last word on the topic, the district court clearly
stated that scolded the bankruptcy court for "compound[ing]ed its error in not
applying the 'control test' by relying on the Bankruptcy Code's definition of
'transfer' and fraudulent transfers as including 'involuntary' and 'indirect
transfers."" 17 One might question the unwritten message from a district court
advising a bankruptcy court not to look at the Bankruptcy Code for the
definition of key statutory terms.
C. The Devil is in the Details of a Transfer
Even though the bankruptcy court found that it could avoid the transfer of
the settlement proceeds to the Transeastern Lenders under § 548, it
alternatively held that § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code could be used to hold the
Transeastern Lenders liable for the transfers as entities "for whose benefit" the
Conveying Subsidiaries transferred the liens to the New Lenders. In doing so,
the bankruptcy court coupled the various avenues of recovery to achieve a
more complete satisfaction, which generally is permissible under the
Bankruptcy Code. 118 Nonetheless, this approach invokes the tangled interplay
of §§ 548 and 550, for which the Bankruptcy Code does not serve as the poster
child of clarity. In In re International Administrative Services, Inc.,119 the
Eleventh Circuit permitted a bankruptcy trustee to pursue avoidance actions
against subsequent transferees of the debtor's property without first chasing
down the initial transfer. This alone falls into step with the Bankruptcy
Code, but the Eleventh Circuit expanded the ambiguities in the statute to
permit the trustee to leapfrog prior transferees and sue the subsequent
transferees first. 121
TOUSA I, expanding on this already broad precedent, not only avoided the
transfer of liens under §§ 544 and 548, but also ordered the Transeastern
Lenders pursuant to § 550 to disgorge payments that they received related to
the transfers.12  The bankruptcy court required each set of defendants to
relinquish the benefits obtained from the July 31 Transaction. This avenue of
relief is somewhat tenuous. It created an almost quixotic leap that permitted the
117 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 548(a)(1)).
118 Jessica D. Gabel and Patricia A. Redmond, Clutching a Home-Run Recovery from a Shortstop
Transferree and the Single-Satisfaction Umpire, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 2009, at 18, 18; see also In re
Prudential of Florida Leasing Inc., 478 F.3d 1291 (1 Ith Cir. 2007).
119 In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (1 1th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter "IAS"].
120 Id. at 707-08.
121 Jd.
122 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. 783, 887 (Banlr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
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Committee to recover transferred property even when the "composite elements
of that value must come from more than one transferee." 123 Just because the
Transeastern Lenders were the last stop on the money train, it does not make
them the transferee or "entity for whose benefit the transfer was made."
124
Indeed, IAS allowed the trustee to skip the hassle of avoiding the transfer to
the initial transferee. The case did not, however, change the fact that the initial
transfer must still be an avoidable one in order to reach the subsequent
transferee directly. But while the bankruptcy court in TOUSA Imay have given
§ 550(a) some extra legs to run on, it did not, as the district court intoned, turn
§ 550 into a super-statute that lays waste to all suspect transfers.
The district court found "the bankruptcy court's overly broad interpretation
of [§] 550(a)" to be one that "erroneously neglect[ed] to analyze the specific
text of that provision." The bankruptcy court's interpretation of § 550(a) was
broad, but the district court's analysis also lost the thrust of the IAS decision.
IAS adopted a more "pragmatic and flexible approach to avoiding transfers."'
125
In explaining its reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
[I]f the Bankruptcy Code conceives of a plaintiff suing independently
to avoid and recover, then bringing the two actions together only
advances the efficiency of the process and furthers the protections
and forgiveness inherent in the bankruptcy laws. The cornerstone of
the bankruptcy courts has always been the doing of equity, and in
situations such as this, where money is spread throughout the globe,
fraudulent transferors should not be allowed to use § 550 as both a
shield and a sword. Not only would subsequent transferees avoid
incurring liability, but they would also defeat recovery and further
diminish the assets of the estate. An opposite result would foster the
creation of similar enterprises, for creditors would design
increasingly complex transactions, with the knowledge that more
transfers decrease the likelihood of a successful avoidance action.
Moreover, the increased cost in litigation and the delays associated
with prolonged investigations would only contribute to a debtor's
shrinking estate. 126
The district court focused on the three types of entities from whom a trustee
may recover an avoidable transfer: (1) an initial transferee, (2) an entity for
whose benefit the initial transfer was made, and (3) a subsequent transferee. It
12, Id. at 884 (quoting Burtruln v. Laughlin (In re Laughlin), 18 B.R. 778, 781 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982)).
124 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2006).
125 [AS, 408 F.3d at 707.
126 Id. (citations omitted).
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was undisputed that the Transeastern Lenders never received any portion of the
lien interest that the Conveying Subsidiaries granted to the New Lenders, so
they could not be considered initial or subsequent transferees. The district
court further rejected the notion that the Transeastern Lenders could be
considered entities for whose benefit the transfers were made just because they
had received some of the proceeds of the new loans.
While the district court reached the right result in terms of the Transeastern
Lenders, it also sold § 550 short as much as the bankruptcy court stretched it.
The district court interpreted § 550(a) as a provision that dictates a single
recovery. Under this analysis, anything more would result in double-dipping
(i.e., the debtor gets back more than what was given away). In the TOUSA
bankruptcy, the avoidance of the liens and recovery of the settlement proceeds
were the only two slices in a nearly $1 billion pie. In order to get both slices,
the Committee needed to demonstrate separately that each was an avoidable
transfer. The district court, however, saw the liens and the settlement proceeds
as being the same slice of a roughly $500 million pie, and the Committee could
not take the same slice twice.
The district court noted that, in the typical case, § 550(a) is meant to
capture "the benefit to a guarantor by the payment of the underlying debt of the
debtor. ' ' 127 The district court found that the bankruptcy court's analysis of
§ 550(a) in this case would drastically and improperly expand that Section's
scope. Therefore, it ultimately rejected the Committee's attempt to collapse the
granting of the liens and payment of the Transeastern Loans into a single
transaction as against the weight of the evidence and inconsistent with
positions that the Committee took on other issues at trial.128 This finding was
factually plausible, but legally myopic. Still, the district court may have
reached a result consistent with the Bankruptcy Code since § 550(a) cannot
bring back that which cannot be avoided. In that case, the bankruptcy court's
finding that the Transeastern Lenders were the transferee or "entity for whose
benefit the transfer was made" is an issue that would require more proof upon
remand, but the district court eliminated that option.
D. The Search for Reasonably Equivalent Value
The core of the district court's opinion-as least as it pertains to the merits
of the fraudulent transfer action-is housed in analysis of "reasonably
127 TOUSA If, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *94 (S.D Fla. Feb. 11,2011).
128 Id. at98.
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equivalent value." Here, in a rather gratuitous maneuver, Judge Gold treaded
on Judge Jordan's territory with the New Lender appeal. But the district court
felt duty-bound to address reasonably equivalent value as a threshold matter to
the entire unwinding of the July 31 Transaction. Perhaps Judge Gold
entertained the issue because of his frustration with what he viewed as a weak
but winning argument under § 550(a)(1) to recover the settlement proceeds
from the Transeastern Lenders.
The first prong in establishing constructive fraud under § 548(a)(1)(B) is
whether the debtor "received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation." 129 Section 548(d)(2) defines value as
"property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the
debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the
debtor or to a relative of the debtor." 130 The statute however, does not provide
a definition of "reasonably equivalent value" and that phrase has been
relegated to a case-by-case determination.' 3 1 Courts have steered away from
using a hard-line or mathematically precise determination of reasonably
equivalent value, and TOUSA II quickly focused on that detail.
32
Receiving something less than the actual market value of the assets
transferred can be sufficient, provided that the values exchanged do not shock
the conscience. 133 This creates unpredictability among the bankruptcy courts,
and cases decided in different contexts invariably lead to different results. 134 In
quashing the order in TOUSA I as to the Transeastern Lenders, TOUSA II
found that the payment to the Transeastern Lenders could not be avoided as a
fraudulent transfer because the factual record established that the Conveying
Subsidiaries received "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange for providing
secured guarantees in the form of "indirect economic benefits."' 135 Such
"benefits" included the ability to avoid defaults of over $1.5 billion of senior
129 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).
130 Jd. § 548(d)(2).
131 In re Abramoft, 92 BR. 698, 703 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
132 TOUSA 11, 2011 WL 522008, at *32, 37 see generally Jack Williams, Fallacies of Contemporary
Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied to Jntercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent-transfer Law as a Fuzzy
System, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 1403 (1994). TOUSA 11 also devoted some discussion to the bankruptcy court's
determination that the lenders acted in bad faith. TOUSA If, 2011 WL 522008, at *48. This Article addresses
the good faith defense more fully in Part V.A.
13, Williams, supra note 132, at 1442.
134 In re Fargo Biltmore Motor Hotel Corp., 49 B.R 782, 788 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
135 TOUSA 11, 2011 WL 522008, at *36-37.
2011]
EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL
loans and bonds owed by TOUSA (guaranteed by the Conveying Subsidiaries)
and the resulting ability to continue business operations.
136
1. TOUSA land the Missing Value
Transactions involving three or more parties in which a debtor's property is
transferred in exchange for consideration passing to a third party present
special difficulties in determining whether reasonably equivalent value has
been received by the debtor. 137 These transactions often take place in the form
of intercorporate guarantees. 13  There are three types of intercorporate
guarantees: downstream, cross-stream, and upstream. 139 In order to finance the
July 31 Transaction, TOUSA needed an upstream guarantee whereby its
subsidiaries would guarantee the parent company's debts. 140 For a transaction
to survive a fraudulent transfer attack, the debtor must have received a specific
and quantifiable economic benefit which preserves the debtor's net worth.
14 1
On one hand, this bar can be a difficult hurdle to overcome in proving an
upstream guarantee is not a fraudulent transfer because the debtor does not
usually receive a "direct benefit" from the transfer of assets or obligation
incurred. 142
On the other hand, some courts have held that the debtor need not receive
reasonably equivalent value directly. 143 The debtor may receive reasonably
equivalent value, or some part thereof, through a benefit conferred upon a third
party. 144 Courts adopted the "indirect benefit doctrine" partially to satisfy the
requirement that a guarantor must receive a direct flow of capital to avoid a
finding of a fraudulent transfer that would be "inhibitory of contemporary
financing practices." 4 5 "[Even] when there has been no direct economic
136 id.
137 In re Ear, Nose and Throat Surgeons of Worcester, Inc., 49 BR. 316, 320 (Bankr. Mass. 1985).
138 Williams, supra note 132, 1417 18.
139 Id. at 1419.
140 TOUSA If, 2011 WL 522008, at *3, 35.
141 In re Burbank Generators, Inc., 48 BR. 204, 207 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 1985).
142 Examples of"direct benefits" would be actual receipt ofmoney and/or property or debt relief. Telefest,
Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (DN.J. 1984); Goveart v. Capital Bank (In re Miami Gen.
Hosp., Inc.), 124 BR. 383, 393 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
143 See Rubin v. Mfr's. Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991 (2nd Cir. 1981) ("although 'transfers solely
for the benefit of third parties do not furnish fair consideration, the transaction's benefit to the debtor need not
be direct and may come through a third party.' (quoting Klien v. Tabatchnik, 610 F.2d 1043, 1407 (2d Cir.
1979))).
144 id
145 In re inage Worldwide Ltd., 139 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[upstream] -guarantees are often
needed because of the unequal abilities of interrelated corporate entities to collateralize loans").
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benefit to a guarantor, some courts performing a fraudulent transfer analysis
have been increasingly willing to look at whether a guarantor received indirect
benefits from the guarantee . ... ,146 Nonetheless, this flexibility has its
limitations: proving reasonably equivalent value in upstream guarantees can, at
best, be challenging, and often amounts to an expensive and losing battle
because "a court will not recognize an indirect benefit unless it is fairly
concrete."147
The bankruptcy court first found that TOUSA's subsidiaries did not receive
a direct benefit from the obligations they incurred to finance the July 31
Transaction. 14 The court emphasized that despite being co-borrowers on a
loan to settle a lawsuit for which they were not defendants, the Conveying
Subsidiaries received none of the proceeds of the loans they became obligated
to repay. 49 More to the point, the Conveying Subsidiaries received no value in
the form of debt relief, received no net value from the acquisition of
homebuilding inventory, and received no value in the form of tax benefits.
50
Because the Conveying Subsidiaries did not receive any direct benefit from
the value they had been given, the burden then shifted to the defendants to
produce evidence that "the debtors indirectly received sufficient, concrete
value." 151 Therefore, the defendants in TOUSA had to prove that the
Conveying Subsidiaries received substantial indirect benefits that would
amount to reasonably equivalent value. 152 In order to prove that, the defendants
argued that "[TOUSA] and its subsidiaries operated as a single business
enterprise, benefiting significantly from centralized operations."' 53 That
structure, the AS argued, enabled the entities to "share an identity of interests,"
which created reasonably equivalent value in the direct consideration that the
TOUSA family received. 1
54
The defendants argued that a "[flailure to resolve the Transeastern
Litigation would have created a default under the revolver and blocked the
146 id
147 id
141 TOUSA , 422 B.R. 783, 844 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 2009).
149 Id.
150 [d. at 844-45.
151 Id. at 866.
152 [I. at 845 (explaining the defendants' arguments).
15, In the defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, the defendant asserted that TOUSA and its Subsidiaries
should be viewed as a single entity. See Post-Trial Memorandum of Defendant at 60, TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. 783
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009)
154 Id. The consideration being the settlement of the joint venture litigation.
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Conveying Subsidiaries' access to the letters of credit and operating cash."'1 55
Furthermore, the defendants argued that "the July 3 1 Transaction benefitted the
Conveying Subsidiaries by adding the Transeastern assets to the borrowing
base for the [rievolver, thereby increasing the amount of money that the
Conveying Subsidiaries and other TOUSA entities could borrow."'
56
The bankruptcy court, however, rejected that argument. 157 Instead, it
concluded that the Conveying Subsidiaries could "have dealt with a possible
[r]evolver default by transitioning to an alternative source of financing."
158
Furthermore, in response to the argument that a benefit resulted from the
increased amount of money available to the subsidiaries, Judge Olson held that
"there [was] no evidence that the Conveying Subsidiaries' cash requirements
exceeded the capacity of the pre-transaction borrowing base." 159 Consequently,
the bankruptcy court held that the defendants failed to establish that the
benefits reached a reasonably equivalent value for the Conveying
Subsidiaries. 1
60
TOUSA I and TOUSA II have different takes on the TOUSA family
structure, and therefore disagree as to whether the proper fraudulent transfer
analysis occurs at the subsidiary level.. TOUSA I treated the TOUSA group
more like individual entities, whereas TOUSA II refers to the TOUSA entities
as one enterprise or group (a single organism) throughout the opinion. 61
Anticipating the factual gaps, the defendants argued that the July 31
Transaction as a whole created value by producing a "synergy" 162 between
TOUSA and its subsidiaries. 63 The indirect benefits asserted by the defendants
included the improvement of the day-to-day business operations of the
subsidiaries as a result of the transaction, and the forestalling of the bankruptcy
of TOUSA, which would have deprived the subsidiaries of a variety of services
155 id
156 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. 783, 847-48 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
57 Id. at 847.
158 i
159 !d. at 848.
160 id
161 TOUSA , No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL522008, at* 14,33,39(S.D. Fla. Feb. 11,2011).
162 Id. at 35, see also Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns., Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3rd Cir. 1991)
("The Banks cite what appears to be legitimate and reasonable expectation that the affiliation of these two
corporations, TCS and Metro, would produce a strong synergy.").
16, TOUSA 1, 422 BR. 783, 845 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 2009). This argument seems inapposite to the district
court's holding that the transactions were separate and improperly treated as one for purposes of a fraudulent
transfer analysis. See TOUSA 11, 2011 WL 522008, at *28-29, 33.
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provided by TOUSA's corporate offices, such as access to a centralized cash-
management system and group purchasing arrangements.
164
The bankruptcy court rejected the argument, holding that business
"synergies" do not establish value under § 548(d)(2)(A) because they do not
constitute "(1) property (2) received by the debtor (3) in exchange for the
obligation or transfer."'165 Applying this test, the court first found that "many of
these business 'synergies' do not constitute 'value' under § 548 because they
are not 'property. ' ' ' 166 Next, the bankruptcy court held that § 548 makes clear
that reasonably equivalent value must be received by the same "debtor" that
incurred the relevant obligation or made the relevant transfer. 167 Finally, the
court found that because these subsidiaries had enjoyed these "synergies" long
before the July 31 Transaction ever occurred, the benefits were not "in
exchange for the obligation or transfer."
' 168
This is a defensible conclusion given that the bankruptcy cases (while
jointly administered) were not substantively consolidated. A substantive
consolidation would have required (for all intents and purposes) the
bankruptcy court to treat TOUSA as one large indivisible enterprise. 169 In the
absence of such treatment, the bankruptcy court could rightly examine the
effect that the July 31 Transaction had on the individual TOUSA components.
Since the bankruptcies were not substantively consolidated, the bankruptcy
court looked to the value of consideration received as compared to the value
given by the debtor to determine whether the debtor received less than
reasonably equivalent value.170 The value of the synergy obtained is difficult to
quantify in dollars without the aid of expert witnesses. 171 The bankruptcy court
had no basis to evaluate the synergy value because the defendants did not
164 TOUSA 1, 422 BR at 846-47.
165 [d. at 869.
166 Id. at 868.
167 dat 867 68.
168 Id. ("The Conveying Subsidiaries enjoyed all of these benefits long before the July 31 Transaction and
there is no evidence that they would have lost these benefits in the event ofa TOUSA bankruptcy.").
169 "Substantive consolidation" usually results in "pooling the assets of, and claims against, [ ] two
entities, satisfying liabilities from the resultant common fund, eliminating inter-company claims, and
combining the creditors of the two companies for purposes of voting on reorganization plans." In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). The doctrine is used "sparingly" because it
"vitally aftect[s] [the] substantive rights" of creditors. Jd.
170 See Barber v. Golden Seed Co., Inc., 129 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1997); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro
Commc'ns., Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 648 (3rd Cir. 1991); Rubin v. Mfr's. Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 993
(2ndCir. 1981).
171 See Barber, 129 F.3d at 387; Mellon Bank, 945 F.2d at 648; Rubin, 661 F.2d at 993.
2011]
EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL
present a fact or expert witness to value the indirect benefits. Consequently, the
lack of evidence left the bankruptcy court to find that the benefits were not
reasonably equivalent to the value given.
172
Courts require that the defendant demonstrate that the transfer was in fact
made for reasonably equivalent value. Whether the value must be numerically
quantifiable in terms of direct (monetary) or indirect (avoiding bankruptcy)
benefits is unsettled. The majority of courts follow a quantification test for
reasonably equivalent value, while other courts have held that quantification of
the indirect benefits is not necessary in order to find that reasonably equivalent
value was given. 173 These latter courts have held that § 548(a)(2)(A) does not
require tangible value or a monetary equivalent when answering the question
of whether reasonably equivalent value has been given in return for the
transfer. 174  Nonetheless, tangible or intangible, the benefits need some
valuation, and the TOUSA I court held that irrespective of whether the benefits
were legally cognizable, or if considered individually or as a whole, they still
fell short of reasonably equivalent value.
175
Even more to the point (and apparently more vexing to the district court),
TOUSA I found that the interest in the property dovetailed into the
172 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. 783, 869 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
173 Courts have been willing to consider indirect benefits received by a debtor, but those benefits must be
relatively concrete. Harker v. Ctr. Motors, Inc. (In re Gerdes), 246 BR. 311, 314 (Banlkr.SD.Ohio 2000); see
also Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir.1998)
(to constitute reasonably equivalent value for payment of an alleged fraudulent transfer, any indirect benefit
must be "fairly concrete"), SPC Plastics Corp. v. Griffith (In re Structurelite Plastics Corp.), 224 BR. 27, 31
(6th Cir. BAP 1998) (finding that the speculative value of indirect benefits like the opportunity to acquire
additional loans or new managerial talent does not constitute fair consideration), Clark v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit
(In re Wes Dor, Inc.), 996 F.2d 237, 243 (10th Cir.1993) ("To the extent indirect benefits could be
considered .. the Bank fails to point to any evidence quantifying the amount of such benefits.") Stillwater
Nat'l Bank and Tr. v. Kirtley (In re Solomon), 299 BR. 626, 638 (10th Cir. BAP 2003) (without
quantification, indirect benefits are not "value," under constructive fraudulent transfer law); Pummill v.
Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale (In re Richards & Conover Steel, Co.), 267 BR. 602, 613 (8th Cir. BAP 2001)
("If the benefits are indirect, they must be 'fairly concrete.'); Official Comm of Unsecured Creditors of
Crystal Med. Prods., Inc. v. Pedersen & Houpt (In re Crystal Med. Prods., Inc.), 240 BR. 290, 300
(Bankr.N.D.lll.1999); Coan v. Fleet Credit Card Servs., Inc. (In re Guerrera), 225 BR. 32, 36
(Bankr.D.Conn.1998) (stating that to constitute "reasonably equivalent value" for alleged fraudulent transfer in
payment of third party's debt, "any indirect benefit received must be 'fairly concrete.' "). But see Mellon Bank,
945 F.2d at 647 ("[t]he ability to borrow money has considerable value in the commercial world. To quantify
that value, however, is difficult. Quantification depends upon the business opportunities the additional credit
makes available to the borrowing corporation and on other imponderables in the operation or expansion of its
business.").
174 See Matter of Moses, 59 BR. 815, 818 (Bankr. ND. Ga. 1986); In re Missionary Baptist Found. of
Am., Inc., 24 BR. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
175 TOUSA , 422 BR. at 869.
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consideration of reasonably equivalent value (discussed, infra, Part III.D.).176
The bankruptcy court determined that the Conveying Subsidiaries had a
property interest in the loan proceeds, but by the same token, the value of that
property was "minimal" because the Conveying Subsidiaries involuntarily
entered into a "contractual commitment that the borrowed funds would be paid
to others, principally the [] Transeastern Lenders."'
77
2. TOUSA IILocates Reasonably Equivalent Value
Initially, it would appear that the bankruptcy and district courts found
common ground as to the de minimis nature of the property interest belonging
to the Conveying Subsidiaries. Indeed, the district court determined that if the
Conveying Subsidiaries had any interest in the proceeds of the loans, such
interest was "minimal."1 78 In reviewing reasonably equivalent value, however,
the district court departed from the bankruptcy court's determination that the
minimal value could not be a reasonably equivalent one. Instead, the district
court agreed with the arguments of the Transeastern Lenders that the
Conveying Subsidiaries received reasonably equivalent value for any transfer
of their minimal interest in the proceeds, because repayment of the
Transeastern Loans eliminated the potential cross-default under the $1 billion
bond debt that would result from an adverse judgment in the Transeastern
litigation. 179 Consequently, minimal interests would suffice for reasonable
equivalent value under the district court's interpretation.
In particular, the district court concluded that
eliminating the threat of these claims against the Conveying
Subsidiaries' parent, and indirectly against each of them, constituted
an enormous economic benefit to these subsidiaries in terms of their
viability as going concerns and their continued access to financing
through the TOUSA parent, which, in turn, allowed them, for a
period of time, to continue to pay interest to the bondholders, the very
creditors at issue.
1I °
176 Id. at 874 ("[T]here is no inconsistency in the Committee's claim that the Conveying Subsidiaries had
a property interest in the proceeds of the term loans and the Committee's simultaneous claim that the
Conveying Subsidiaries did not receive reasonably equivalent value from the First and Second Lien
Lenders.").
177 id.
178 TOUSA II, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *27-28 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11,2011).
179 [d. at *36
'80 Id. at *38.
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Simply put, the district court ruled that indirect economic benefits to a
corporate group-the single organism approach-should factor into reasonably
equivalent value (i.e., adequate consideration) for purposes of a fraudulent
transfer analysis under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 181
In TOUSA II, the district court took issue with the bankruptcy court's
analysis of the "value" (or lack thereof) received by the Conveying
Subsidiaries from the July 31 Transaction.182 The district court stressed that the
bankruptcy court's reasoning was a blemish on the face of the judiciary-
unsupported by either applicable case law or legislative history.183 The district
court staunchly disagreed with the bankruptcy court's finding that the
Conveying Subsidiaries could not have received meaningful "value" as part of
the July 31 Transaction, because as the bankruptcy court found, the Conveying
Subsidiaries did not receive direct and identifiable "property" of a quantifiable
value. 1
84
TOUSA II scolded the bankruptcy court for looking to the dictionary
definition of "property" (which defines the word to include "some kind of
enforceable entitlement to some tangible or intangible article"), when
considering the term in the context of a fraudulent transfer.185 The district court
did acknowledge (although it made little difference) that the definition of
"property" is absent from the Bankruptcy Code; curiously, however, it failed to
acknowledge that the use of dictionary definitions is proper when no such
definition exists in the Code. l1 6 Indeed, both the Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit have endorsed the use of and relied upon a dictionary for the
definitions of statutory terms. 187
Nonetheless, TOUSA II held that the narrow definition applied to "value"
by the bankruptcy court was clearly erroneous and constituted reversible error
because the applicable case law and legislative history indicated that "indirect,
181 Jd.
182 Id. at *31.
183 id.
114 Jdat *30-31.
85 Idat *31.
186 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
460 (U.S. 1999) (J. Thomas, concurring) (using the Random House Dictionary for the definition of "on
account of').
187 Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 53 (U.S. 1992) (using Webster's Third New International
Dictionary for the definition of "assignee") Harem v. James (In re James), 406 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.
2005) (citing the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary and noting that "[fln determining the ordinary meaning
of statutory terms, we often find guidance in dictionary definitions").
[Vol. 27
TIE TERRIBLE TOUSAS
intangible and prospective future economic benefits" can constitute "value" for
purposes of a fraudulent transfer analysis.18 TOUSA II adopted the
Transeastern Lenders' position that the value flowing to an integrated
corporate family should include indirect benefits that preserve the net worth
and ongoing business operations of the corporate family.1
8 9
In applying its definition of "value" to the analysis of the July 31
Transaction, the district court determined that the settlement of the
Transeastern Litigation conferred reasonably equivalent "economic benefits"
on the Conveying Subsidiaries by enabling the debtor as a whole (i.e., the
parent and its Conveying Subsidiaries) to avoid defaulting on obligations in
excess of $1.5 billion.1 90 The district court emphasized (and re-emphasized)
the integrated nature of the TOUSA family (or "enterprise" as the district court
put it, perhaps channeling the image of a Mafia family enterprise).1 91 In short,
TOUSA found that the value provided by the July 31 Transaction simply was
TOUSA's ability to continue teetering on the brink of bankruptcy rather than
plunging head first-which it ultimately did six months later. 192 Thus, TOUSA
1I held that, under these circumstances, "no further proof of 'quantification'
was required to establish reasonably equivalent value," as these were
"precisely the kind of benefits that . . . are not susceptible to exact
quantification but are nonetheless legally cognizable under [§] 548" of the
Bankruptcy Code. 
193
The difference in opinion here seems to be one that likely will find its way
to the Eleventh Circuit. On the one hand, the circumstances of TOUSA do not
fit the situation where indirect benefits from a guarantee are found to constitute
reasonably equivalent value. Courts that uphold cross-stream guarantees
generally do so when the transaction strengthens the viability of the corporate
group. 194 In this case, though, it is difficult to assess if the parent and the
Conveying Subsidiaries benefitted mutually from the loan.
At best, the settlement kept the company hooked up to another six months
of life support. By the time the July 31 Transaction took place, the TOUSA
parent was in dire financial straits while the Conveying Subsidiaries were
188 TOUSA If, 2011 WL 522008, at *35 36.
189 Id.
190 [Id.
'9' See id. at *2, *5, *9, *16, *36, and *39.
192 Id. at *36.
193 [d. at *40.
194 In re Image Worldwide, Ltd., 139 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 1998).
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arguably solvent.195 So, by virtue of the July 31 Transaction, it is plausible that
the Conveying Subsidiaries kept the parent out of bankruptcy by bankrupting
themselves. Courts have held that "[t]his shift of risk from the creditors of the
debtor to the creditors of the guarantor is exactly the situation that fraudulent
transfer law seeks to avoid when applied to guarantees." 96 Therefore, it could
be that the Conveying Subsidiaries received an indirect benefit from the
transaction, but yet did not receive reasonably equivalent value. If that is the
case, then the harsh rebuke handed down by TOUSA II is unnecessarily hostile.
TOUSA II further contraverted TOUSA I's reasoning by noting that the
bankruptcy court improperly shifted the burden of proving reasonably
equivalent value to the defendants, which ran contrary to the district court's
notion of Eleventh Circuit precedent that requiring "the burden of proving lack
of reasonably equivalent value .. . [to rest] on the party challenging the
transfer."' 197 It is perhaps a stretch to say that the burden was shifted. Rather,
the focus was on the calculation of reasonably equivalent value, which
generally forces both sides (not just the plaintiff) to present some numbers,
especially when the case carries so-called "indirect benefits."' 198 In order for
the bankruptcy court properly to assess reasonably equivalent value, "[the
value of consideration received must be compared to the value given by the
debtor."1 99 Although calculating "direct" benefits (such as an investment of
cash that yields a cash return) is easier, the math becomes more difficult when
benefits are "indirect."2 '
Nonetheless, "[t]hese indirect economic benefits must be measured and
then compared to the obligations that the bankrupt incurred." 20' In that context
then, the bankruptcy court in TOUSA I had to decide whether value had been
transferred, and thus it rightly "examine[d] all aspects of the transaction and
carefully measure[d] the value of all benefits and burdens to the debtor, direct
'9' TOUSA 1 422 B.R. 783 793 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
196 InrefImage Worldivide, 139 F.3d at 581 82.
197 TOUSA If, 2011 WL 522008, at *26.
198 This deternination depends on the circumstances of each case and not on a fixed mathematical
formula. See Barber v. Golden Seed Co., Inc., 129 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1997); In re R.M.L., Inc., 92 F.3d
139, 145 (3d Cir. 1996). Fair market value is one factor a bankruptcy court may consider. Whether a
bankruptcy court uses proper methodology in assessing value is an issue of law reviewed de novo. In re
Dunhan, 110 F.3d 286, 289 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1997).
199 Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns., Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991).
200 id.
201 id.
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or indirect., 20 2 Of course, the bankruptcy court may have found an incorrect
calculation to be more persuasive, but that is insufficient to warrant a charge of
burden shifting. Instead, the real issue is that the bankruptcy court seemed to
raise the bar of due diligence that an old lender (such as the Transeastern
Lenders) must perform before accepting a repayment (the settlement proceeds)
that is funded by new lenders (the first- and second-lienholders). The district
court delivered a solid one-two punch when it found reasonably equivalent
value and then sanctimoniously bench-slapped the bankruptcy court for putting
the onus of diligence on vulnerable lenders.
Despite the fact that the bankruptcy court was more than heavy-handed
with TOUSA's lenders, it was also refreshing that the lenders could not escape
with the "it sounded like a good idea at the time" defense. But, the district
court found fault in what it thought was the bankruptcy court playing Monday
morning quarterback. TOUSA II characterized the bankruptcy court's review of
the July 3 1 Transaction "through the lens of retrospection" as grievous error
because, in the district court's view, the bankruptcy court failed to evaluate
reasonably equivalent value "as of the date of the transaction." 20 3 Claiming that
the bankruptcy court only resorted to hindsight to evaluate the July 3 1
Transaction is misplaced. Transactions do not exist in a vacuum. Bankruptcy
courts must look to the circumstances surrounding the transaction- including
that the July 31 Transaction may have been a catalyst for TOUSA's precipitous
fall into bankruptcy.
204
These polarized opinions as to reasonably equivalent value stem from the
fact that the two courts had different views on TOUSA's corporate structure.
However, a discrepancy appears to arise in TOUSA JIwhere the court treats the
company as one, behemoth corporate organism, but then it later treats the July
. 205
31 Transaction as multiple compartmentalized transactions. TOUSA I held
that the bankruptcy court erred by analyzing reasonably equivalent value at the
level of the Conveying Subsidiaries as opposed to the corporate family. The
district court also faulted the bankruptcy court for commingling the
transactions-that is lumping them into one larger transaction for purposes of
202 In re Richards & Conover Steel Co., 267 B.R. 602, 612 (8th Cir. BAP 2001); Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.2d 1407, 1414 (8th Cir. 1996).
20, In re Richards & Conover Steel Co., 267 B.R. at 612; In re Young, 82 F.2d at 1414.
204 See, e.g., In re Matter ofZedda, 103 F.3d 1195, 1206 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Whether a transfer is made for
a reasonably equivalent value is, in every case, largely a question of fact. As such, considerable latitude must
be allowed to the trier of facts, for in each case that determination depends entirely on the peculiar facts and
circumstances.")
205 See supra Part 111A.
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bootstrapping § 550 liability onto § 548 liability."' While the latter criticism
may be valid, TO USA II is not immune to questionable analysis.
The district court found that the transfer referred to in § 550 must be the
same transfer that is avoided under § 548.207 TOUSA II determined that the
transfer at issue was properly the transfer of liens to the term-loan lenders
rather than the transfer of funds to the Transeastern Lenders. As a result, the
district court found that the bankruptcy court erred by attempting to collapse
each aspect of the July 2007 Transaction into one larger transfer for avoidance
purposes when only the transfer of liens was potentially avoidable as a
fraudulent conveyance. 2 0 8 It is doubtful that the bankruptcy court treated the
transaction as it did merely for the sake of convenience. At worst, it was a
misapplication of law that touts a "more pragmatic and flexible approach" to
§ 550 and other theories of recovery for fraudulent transfer actions,"' but it is
nonetheless imprecise on how to do so.
If the bankruptcy court is to be faulted for handling the July 31 Transaction
as one large deal among multiple parties to settle one lawsuit, then the district
court equally could be faulted for taking a piecemeal approach to the
transaction. Even the defendants argued that, on a whole, the transaction
benefitted the Conveying Subsidiaries. Bankruptcy case law is not absolute
with regard to complex transactions. 2 1 In general, bankruptcy determinations
among the district courts tend to be inconsistent and unpredictable, with little
clarity as to what qualifies as precedent as opposed to merely persuasive
authority. 2 1 1 It is difficult to reconcile the district court's determination that
TOUSA is one entity for the purpose of receiving benefits, and then later treat
the July 31 Transaction as among multiple entities in terms of transferring
value away.
206 TOUSA , No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *44-46 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
207 [d. at *45.
208 id.
209 [AS, 408 F.3d at 707.
210 See e.g., Morse Operations, Inc. v. Goodway Graphics of Va. (In re Lease-A-Fleet, Inc.), 155 BR.
666, 676 (Bankr. E.D. P a. 1993) ("Each of the circular financial transactions between the parties in issue must
therefore be 'collapsed' into one transaction to appreciate their impact upon the Debtor. When each circle of
cash is viewed as a single transaction, it is clear that the same monies simply passed through from [parent] to
Debtor to the [affiliate].").
211 Gabel & Maizel, supra note 14, at 50.
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By its terms and application, "the concept of 'reasonably equivalent value'
does not demand a precise dollar-for-dollar exchange." 212 TOUSA I did not
have to hurdle an impossible wall to reach a conclusion that the Conveying
Subsidiaries received little to nothing in return at the actual time of the July 31
Transaction, other than the (arguably) value of the cessation of the
Transeastern lawsuit.2 13 The bankruptcy court did, in fact, hold a thirteen-day
trial.214 It seems less than "clearly erroneous" that, even given the value of
removing the cloud hanging over the parent, it still "would have to be deeply
discounted to reflect [TOUSA parent's] precarious financial situation at the
time" the July 31 Transaction was made. 215 TOUSA's ability to repay the loans
was tied directly to its ability to improve profitability. If the company
succeeded, both the Conveying Subsidiaries and the parent company would
prosper. Conversely, if either parent or subsidiary failed, the other would go
down with it.
This does not change the fact, however, that TOUSA had essentially
pledged the value of the company against itself, which meets the statutory
definition of "presumptive insolvency."216 The bankruptcy court was in the
best position to determine that the "promises were built on sand and delivered
after the fact," and could not, therefore, "present a 'reasonably equivalent
value."' 217 So it seems that the district suffered from a case of the Goldilocks
Syndrome: TOUSA I conceived of the transaction in terms too large (one
mammoth transaction) and then conceived of the fraudulent transfer analysis in
terms too small (at the subsidiary level). It would be grand if TOUSA II
stepped in and got it all just right, but more realistically, both courts got some
parts right and some parts wrong. Ideally, the bankruptcy court would be able
need to make additional findings as to whether TOUSA is a common
enterprise and whether the July 31 Transaction is a divisible one.
Unfortunately, these issues likely will be batted around in further appeals.
212 Advanced Telecomm. Network, Inc. v. Allen (In re Advanced Telecomm Network, Inc.), 490 F.3d
1325, 1336 (11 th Cir. 2007) (citing Henderson v. Andrews (In re Perry Cnty. Foods, Inc.), 313 B.R. 875, 895
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004 (citations omitted))).
213 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. 783, 866 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
214 Id. at786.
215 See In re Advanced Teleconmm. Network, 490 F.3d at 1337.
216 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. at 862 see II U.S.C § 101(32) (2006).
217 In re Advanced Teleconmm. Network, 490 F.3d at 1337.
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111. LINGERING ISSUES IN MACRO-LENDING, DISTRESSED FINANCING, AND
SPECULATIVE INVESTING
While the district court proved to be thorough in its criticisms of TOUSA I,
there are lingering issues that TOUSA II did not address. 2 18 With two other
appeals pending before Judges Jordan and Moreno (covering issues not
addressed in Judge Gold's opinion), and the inevitable appeal of TOUSA II up
the ladder to the Eleventh Circuit, these issues will resurface. They extend
beyond the tale of TOUSA and its financial predicaments. History has a
tendency to repeat itself. Centuries before the spectacular failures of Lehman
Brothers, AIG, WaMu and Wachovia, Fannie and Freddie were Semper
Augustus and the Viceroy. Coveted more than any other commodity or
investment, these two odd fellows were rare tulip varietals. 219 These simple
flowers served as the catalyst for "Tulipomania," a time during the Dutch
Golden Age when contract prices for the newly introduced tulip bulbs soared
to astonishing levels and then suddenly collapsed to a mere pittance.
220
Tulipomania peaked in February 1637, when certain bulbs were selling for
more than ten times the annual income of a skilled laborer.
221
The burst of the housing bubble in 2007 mirrors Tulipomania and so many
other subsequent bubbles. Even in 2011-more than three years after TOUSA
filed for bankruptcy-the effects of the housing bust still ripple through the
economy with foreclosures hovering at record levels. 22 2 As industries clamor
for survival, the credit markets clutch funds in tight fists and probably will not
218 TOUSA I only addressed the underlying January 31 Transaction as it affected the Transeastern
Lenders. Other appeals are pending as to (1) the first- and second-lien lenders and (2) certain underlying
fiduciary obligations. See supra note 15.
219 Charles Mackay, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS 142-44 (1841) There are many
parallels between the advent of Tulipomania and the speculative housing bubble of 2006. The Dutch
government, in an attempt to encourage investment in merchant fleets, legally changed all tulip buying
contracts to tulip options contracts, limiting the potential liability of speculative investors to less than 4% of
the amount invested. Earl A. Thompson, The Tulipmania: Fact or Artifact, 130 PUB. CHOICE 99, 102 (Jan.
2007). This led to an explosion in tulip prices as buyers, acting in rational self-interest, bought up these
artificially cheap options and then reacted to rising tulip prices by exercising them. [d. Similarly, a number of
U.S. government policies, including tax incentives, artificially low interest rates, and the dangling possibility
of a bail-out, led banks and individuals acting in self-interest to overinvest in the market. Brian Doherty, The
Housing Boom and Bust, REASON MAGAZINE. May 20, 2010. Thus, the problems presented represent not the
madness of crowds, but rather the tragedy of the commons. See also Thompson, supra note 219, at 102.
220 Mackay, supra note 219, at 139 53.
221 Thompson, supra note 219, at 103.
222 See Kathleen M. Howley, U.S. Loans in Foreclosure Tie Record as Lenders Delay Seizures,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 17, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-17/u-s-loans-in-
foreclosure-tie-record-as-lenders-delay-seizures.html
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loosen the purse strings anytime soon (despite capital markets' praise for
TOUSA I]). From the macro-lending perspective: funding, loan opportunities,
and credit availability are awash in the calculus of risk. Whether a fledgling
industry or a conglomerate survives depends on the ability to swim through the
morass of complex loans and risky debt. Bubbles will come and go, but the
issues below seem to predominate and endure.
A. The Relevancy of Insolvency
With the ambiguities and assumptions involved in the "reasonably
equivalent value" prong of § 548 in an upstream guarantee, 223 the majority of
the thirteen-day trial instead revolved around the second prong of the
constructive fraud test: insolvency. 224 More specifically, the plaintiffs focused
on proving that TOUSA "was insolvent on the date that such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation." 225 "Courts analyze solvency with three main tests[:] the
balance sheet test, the cash flow test, and the adequate capital test." 226 "The
'balance sheet' test of insolvency (11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(1)) requires
proof that the sum of the debts of a [debtor] is greater than the fair value of that
[debtor]'s property."' 27 The adequate capital test "asks whether a [debtor] has
sufficient capital to support operations in the event that performance is below
expectations." 228 The cash flow test analyzes whether the debtor is able to pay
its debts as they mature.229 Interestingly, TOUSA II makes but a few mentions
of the insolvency prong of the case, and none of them discuss the issue or
conclusions in detail. 230 In some ways, insolvency-a core tenant of a
fraudulent transfer analysis-was irrelevant to the district court's holding.
Perhaps the Eleventh Circuit will give it more credence.
223 Generally, upstream guarantees are vulnerable to fraudulent transfer liability. Transfers by a debtor
that operate solely or principally to benefit an affiliated entity will constitute fraudulent transfers when the
other elements of a fraudulent transfer are present. See generally Rubin v. Mfr's. Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979
(2nd Cir. 1981 ); In re Holly Hill Medical Center, Inc., 44 B.R. 253 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1984).
224 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. 783, 802-44 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); see also 11 U. S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
225 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I).
226 Post-Trial Memorandum for Senior Transeastern Lenders at 31, TOUSA 1, 422 BR. 783 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2009) (No. 08-10928).
227 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. at 858.
228 Id. at 862.
229 id
230 See generally, TOUSA 11, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
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1. The Balance Sheet Test
The bankruptcy court found TOUSA to be insolvent under the balance
sheet test, requiring proof that the debtor's sum of debts is greater than the fair
value of that debtor's property, as presented by the Committee's experts.
2 31
Using two "well-accepted methods of valuation," 232 the court found that "each
Conveying Subsidiary's debts exceeded the fair value of its assets ...both
before and after the July 31 Transaction. '"2 33 Under the first method of
valuation, the bankruptcy court determined that the "total enterprise value"
compared with the company's debts "demonstrated that TOUSA was insolvent
on a consolidated basis and that each of the Conveying Subsidiaries was
insolvent as well. '2 34 Under the second method, "the Committee's real estate
expert[] determined the fair value of the [Conveying Subsidiaries'
homebuilding assets as of July 31, 2007. " 235 "[T]he Committee's accounting
expert[] incorporated those values to construct balance sheets for each
Conveying Subsidiary. The results show[ed] that each Conveying Subsidiary's
debts exceeded the fair value of its assets on July 31, 2007, both before and
after the July 31 Transaction. '" 236 This, of course, raises the likelihood of
TOUSA spiraling into the "zone of insolvency," but the district court (and to
some extent the bankruptcy court) steered clear of any such discussion.2 37
In response to the Committee's valuation of the TOUSA subsidiaries'
assets, the defendants first "filed a motion before trial to exclude the expert
testimony .. .regarding the valuation of the Debtors' real-estate assets as
unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc ..... ,.238 Daubert (and
Federal Rule of Evidence 702) requires a court to weigh the reliability of
231 TOUSA , 422 BR. at 858 62.
232 The court's opinion goes into much detail in its analysis of the various experts and their valuations,
both in terms of substance and credibility. Id.
233 [d. at 859.
234 id
235 [d.
236 id
231 [d. at 839. Historically, the "zone of insolvency" is a concept created when a company enters a time of
financial distress, and the fiduciary duties of the board of directors expands. Courts have held that fiduciary
duties to creditors arise upon a corporation's "insolvency-in-fact," rather than when a party institutes formal
bankruptcy proceedings. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992). There is also
the concept of "deepening insolvency," which holds that a defendant may be liable for "deepening insolvency"
where the defendant's conduct, either fraudulently or even negligently, prolongs the life of a corporation
thereby increasing the corporation's debt and exposure to creditors. Pennsylvania has joined the growing list of
jurisdictions recognizing this doctrine. See Official Comm of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co,
Inc., 267 F.3d 340, 349 50 (3rd Cir. 2001).
238 TOUSA 1 422 B.R at 859.
[Vol. 27
TIE TERRIBLE TOUSAS
proposed testimony before it can be admitted. 239 Although they are neither
exclusive nor exhaustive, the factors vary depending on the subject, and a court
may consider whether the method can and has been tested, whether it "has
been subjected to peer review and publication," whether it has a "known or
potential rate of error," and finally, whether it has gained "general acceptance"
within the relevant scientific community
. 
240 The defendants' motion argued
that the Committee's real estate expert was "unqualified because he [was] not a
licensed appraiser and his opinions [were] unreliable."2 4 1 The bankruptcy court
disagreed, however, and found each of the Committee's real estate experts'
valuation methods acceptable under Daubert.242 In addition, the court also
found it "inconsequential that [the expert was] not a licensed appraiser ....
The defendants also offered their own expert witnesses. 244 One expert
proposed that "the solvency analysis in this case must be examined on a
'common enterprise' basis." 245 The defendants believed that TOUSA and its
subsidiaries operated as one larger entity and should therefore be treated as
246such.. The bankruptcy court discounted this "common enterprise" approach
on two premises.247 First, "the evidence clearly shows that TOUSA could, and
did, rely on the separateness of individual legal entities when it served its best
interests. Testimony from many TOUSA employees confirmed that TOUSA
routinely recognized the distinctions among its individual subsidiaries. '" 248 This
relationship "was similar to the typical relationship between corporate parents
and subsidiaries." 249 Second, § 548 "requires consideration of whether 'the
debtor' was insolvent and, because each of the Conveying Subsidiaries is a
separate and distinct 'debtor,' each must be considered separately." 250 In
TOUSA I, this statutory interpretation of § 548 raised questions regarding the
future use of the "common enterprise" defense to prove solvency in
239 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 95 (1993); FED. R EvID. 702 (2010).
240 Daubert, 509 US.at 592-95.
241 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. at 823.
242 id.
24, Id
244 [d. at 831.
245 Id. at 833.
246 [d. at 861.
247 Id. at 833-34.
248 Idat 834.
249 id
250 Id. at 861.
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intercorporate guaranty transactions. In TOUSA II, the defense was
resurrected. 51
2. Unreasonably Small Capital Test and Cash Flow Test
The unreasonably small capital test "asks whether a [debtor] has sufficient
capital to support operations in the event that performance is below
expectations." 252 To complement this analysis, the bankruptcy court examined
contemporaneous market evidence and held that TOUSA had been insolvent at
the time of the July 31 Transaction.253 Much to the district court's chagrin, the
bankruptcy court's analysis focused largely on the facts surrounding the case,
including "the deterioration of the real estate market in the months leading up
to the closing.2 54 While the district court disagreed with the relative nature of
hindsight employed by the bankruptcy court in TOUSA I, the market evidence
indicated that TOUSA had some inkling of the severity of the downturn: the
negative effect on TOUSA's operating results, the downgrade in rating by
ratings agencies, and the drop in TOUSA's stock and bond prices. 255 Clearly,
the bankruptcy court rejected this ostrich-like approach: sticking one's head in
the ground and ignoring the coming financial Armageddon.
The bankruptcy court also examined the negative internal assessments by
TOUSA's management and its auditors who requested a pre-petition going-
concern opinion because of TOUSA's inability to satisfy its loan-revolver
covenants. 256 In this blend of the unreasonably small capital and cash-flow
analyses (the latter examining whether the debtor is able to pay its debts as
they mature), the court determined that this evidence established that the July
31 Transaction would leave TOUSA without any breathing room if the
economy continued to underperform as well as an inability to meet financial
obligations as they matured.257 "Because the parent company was left with
unreasonably small capital to operate its business, [its] [s]ubsidiaries also were
left with unreasonably small capital.,, 258 Furthermore, the court found that the
"evidence of balance sheet insolvency [was] also proof that the Conveying
251 TOUSA 11, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *25 (SD. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
252 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. at 862.
25 Id. at 790.
254 Brighton, supra note 13.
255 TOUSA L 422 B.R at 790-92.
256 Id. at 792-99.
257 [d. at 799.
258 id
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Subsidiaries had unreasonably small capital., 259 This particular piece of
TOUSA I caused a kerfuffle among distressed lenders that parachute in when a
company hits the skids. It effectively put the onus on them to amplify their due
diligence procedures before entering into such transactions. 26 In other words,
the bankruptcy court determined that TOUSA had no business entering into the
loans, and the lenders should have known that. TOUSA II, on the other hand,
gave the lenders a pass by removing that burden.
261
3. Ability to Pay Debts as They Become Due
The final test for insolvency is whether the debtor will be able to pay its
debts as they mature.262 This prong of § 548 is met if it can be shown that the
debtor made a transfer or incurred an obligation with knowledge that
subsequent creditors would likely not be paid as their claims matured.263
While the statute suggests a standard based on subjective intent, the
courts have held that the intent requirement can be inferred where the
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction show that the
debtor could not have reasonably believed that it would be able to
pay its debts as they matured...
The bankruptcy court held that TOUSA and, more particularly, the
Conveying Subsidiaries, failed this insolvency test based on the evidence
surrounding the July 31 Transaction, including the testimony and
contemporaneous documents of members of TOUSA's senior management;
the analyses provided by the Committee's experts; the evidence of the market
pricing of TOUSA's debt; and, TOUSA's actual inability to meet its financial
obligations shortly after the July 31 Transaction. 265 The bankruptcy court also
noted that listening to the lenders' experts reminded it of "the fable of the blind
man describing an elephant. '266 But the district court was persuaded that the
TOUSA intercompany accounts were an irreconcilable "pile of tangled
spaghetti," that demonstrated the need for a holistic fraudulent transfer analysis
259 [d. at 862.
260 id
261 TOUSA , No. 10-60017-CIVWGOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *49 (S.D. Fla. Feb.,2011).
262 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. at 862.
263 Id. at 859 (citing WRT Creditors Litig. Trust v. WRT Bankr. Litig. Master (In re WRT Energy Corp.),
282 B.R. 343, 415 (Bankr. W.D La. 2001)).
264 Id. at 862-63 (citing WRT Creditors Litig. Trust, 282 B.R. at 415).
265 [d. at 863.
266 Id. at 838 n. 33.
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(as opposed to the subsidiary-level analysis employed by the bankruptcy
court).
26 7
IV. SOLVENCY OPINION
One of the more potent aspects of the July 31 Transaction was one that the
district court did not feel obliged to discuss. In June 2007, TOUSA required a
solvency opinion from Alix Partners. 26 After a large investor raised an alarm
about TOUSA bonds, the administrative agent on the new loans demanded that
a solvency opinion be provided before the closing of the July 31
Transaction. 269 These opinions are routine in such transactions, but the level of
due diligence applied can be remarkably low due to the increased pressure for
a favorable opinion that keeps the transaction moving forward.
270
The court rejected the credibility of the TOUSA solvency opinion for three
reasons.271 First, the commitment letter "required a solvency opinion from a
nationally recognized, independent financial advisory firm that ha[d]
substantial experience in providing solvency opinions in connection with
transactions similar to the Transaction[] contemplated hereby. '272 But, because
"Alix had not provided a solvency opinion for a homebuilder since before
2005," it had an "apparent lack of experience." 273 The bankruptcy court also
criticized Alix for relying on the financial projections provided by TOUSA's
management without conducting an independent review of the historical
accuracy of those numbers. 274 Moreover, the opinion only evaluated TOUSA
as a consolidated body, as opposed to an independent analysis of the
275
subsidiaries. Finally, the bankruptcy court emphasized the most damning
evidence: that the solvency opinion was contracted on a contingency fee
arrangement.276
267 TOUSA 1, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *42 n.54 (SD. Fla. Feb., 2011).
268 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. at 840.
269 [d. at 839.
270 See e.g., Nancy Czaplinski et al., Solvency Opinions: What Borrowers
and Lenders Need to Know, AM. APPRAISAL (2010), http://www.ainerican-appraisal.us/userfiles/file/
Solvency%200pinions FINAL 07082010.pdf
271 TOUSA1, 422 B.R at 839-43.
272 [d. at 839 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27, Id.
274 Jeffrey Rothschild, In re TOUSA, Inc.: Implications for Solvency Opinion Providers, MCDERMOTI,
WILL & EMERY (Nov. 3, 2009), http://wwwmwe.coln/index.cfrn/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object id/
35b50a74-8ea8-4869-a95c-f676bd55db36.cfm.
275 TOUSA , 422 BR. at 839.
276 Id.
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TOUSA agreed to pay $2 million if Alix ultimately opined that
TOUSA would be solvent immediately following the July 31
Transaction; but if Alix could not so opine, TOUSA would pay Alix
only its time charges and reimburse its costs. These ultimately
amounted to less than half of the $2 million fee which was paid.
277
The bankruptcy court was persuaded by both the conflict of interest and the
fact that Alix expected to provide a favorable opinion only five days after
being retained. 278 TOUSA I should be a word of caution to solvency opinion
providers; it highlights that opinion providers should carefully vet these issues
when they are structuring their fee arrangement in the early stages of such
engagements-and TOUSA IFs silence on the issue may well indicate that this
is an issue (as opposed to so many others) on which the two courts agree. 27
9
A. A Good Faith Defense (of the Duty of Due Diligence)
The relative considerations of good and bad faith are fundamental issues in
fraudulent transfer actions. 28 Coupled with the "reasonably equivalent value"
criterion for constructive fraud under § 548, TOUSA I rejected the Transeastem
Lenders' good faith defense under § 548(c). 28 1 Conversely, the district court
determined that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in finding that the
Transeastern Lenders acted in bad faith because the bankruptcy court had
improperly imposed a "patently unreasonable and unworkable" legal duty on
the Transeastern Lenders to investigate the internal refinancing structure of
TOUSA and its subsidiaries before they accepted the settlement payment.
282
The district court castigated this increased due diligence standard and held
that the bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law in seeking to "pose an unfair
burden on creditors to investigate all aspects of their debtors and the affiliates
of those debtors before agreeing to accept payments for valid debts owed."
283
Although the district court concluded that a heightened duty to investigate was
277 Id. at 839-40.
278 Rothschild, supra note 274.
279 [id.
280 See generally In re Jacobs, 394 B.R 646 (Bankr. ED.N.Y. 2008).
281 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. at 869 (explaining that § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code (and similar provisions of
equivalent state laws) provides a defense for a transferee who has received the transfer "in good faith" and "fbr
value") see also 11 U. S.C. § 548(c) (2006) (indicating that, for purposes of fraudulent transfer actions,
"value' includes "satisfaction ... of a present or antecedent debt"); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re
Manhattan Inv. Fund), 397 BR. 1, 17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that good faith is a far more fact-
intensive inquiry from an objective perspective).
282 TOUSA H, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *48 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11,2011).
28, Id. at *50.
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not supported by applicable law, the objective measure of good faith under
§ 548(c) is less certain in practice.
Under § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a transferee or obligee "that takes
for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred
or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that
such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such
transfer or obligation." 284 Knowledge by the transferee of the insolvency of the
debtor at the time of the transfer may refute a claim of good faith on the part of
the transferee. Also, a transferee does not act in good faith when he has
sufficient knowledge to (at least) place him on inquiry notice of the debtor's
possible insolvency.
285
When examining the transferee's knowledge of the debtor's insolvency, the
good faith test requires an examination of the objective facts, such as what the
transferee should have known, or what a reasonably prudent person in the
transferee's position would have known. 286 Moreover, courts have generally
held that it is not necessary to show that the transferee had actual fraudulent
intent, though fraudulent intent on the part of the transferee would clearly
287establish the lack of good faith.
Applying this standard in TOUSA I, the bankruptcy court concluded that
the lenders and their agent, Citi, had more than sufficient knowledge of
TOUSA's insolvency based on publicly available information.288 As a result,
the bankruptcy court determined that Citi should have foreseen the severity of
the market downturn and recognized the risks.289 In a lengthy discussion, the
court detailed the indicators of a crashing housing market that had occurred
prior to the July 31 Transaction. z9 These indicators included a March 2007
"Special Comment" by Moody's stating "that its outlook on the homebuilding
284 11 U S.C. § 548(c); see also Rinn v. Fraidin (In re Fraidin), 257 BR. 437, 440 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001).
285 Enron Corp. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), 2005 WL 3832053, at *19 (Bankr.
SD NY. 2005).
286 [id.
287 Durkin v. Shields (In re Imperial Corp. of Am.), No. 92-1003-1EG (LSP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20943, at *13-14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1997) ("While the Bankruptcy Code does not define 'good faith,' courts
generally consider whether the transferee objectively knew or should have known of the debtor/transferor's
fraudulent purpose."), Armstrong v. Ketterling (In re Anchorage Marina, Inc.), 93 BR. 686, 693 (Bankr. D.
N.D. 1988) ("Transferees are not acting in good faith when they have knowledge sufficient to put them on at
least inquiry notice of the debtor's possible insolvency.").
288 TOUSA 1 422 BR. 783, 795-97 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
289 [d. at 796.
290 id.
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industry, which had been 'cautiously negative' in the summer of 2006, was
'more assertively negative' from the fall of 2006 to the present."291 In addition,
"numerous analysts, ratings agencies[,] and market participants recognized that
TOUSA was deeply troubled. 292 For example, in May 2007, "Debtwire
reported that TOUSA bondholders had warned that the company would be
entering the 'zone of insolvency' if it took on the new financing to settle with
the Transeastern Lenders," and "ratings agencies Moody's and Standard &
Poor's both downgraded their ratings of TOUSA bonds in contemplation of the
July 31 Transaction, concluding that TOUSA was 'not likely' to be able to
meet its financial obligations."
293
Once a transferee is determined to be on inquiry notice of the debtor's
insolvent status, the transferee must demonstrate that it exercised a reasonable
amount of due diligence in determining the legitimacy of the transfer.294 In
TOUSA I, the bankruptcy court was not only critical of the lack of due
diligence performed by Citi before finalizing the transaction, but it also
continued even further to find that Citi's actions equated to negligence. 295 In
particular, Citi "failed to uncover the privately-held views of TOUSA's senior
management, which were considerably more pessimistic than TOUSA's
projections used to support the July 3 1 Transaction." 296 According to the
bankruptcy court, if Citi had been more precise in its investigation, then Citi
could have found evidence of insolvency, such as the Strategic Alternatives
memo in which TOUSA's CEO, Antonio Mon, observed that the July 31
Transaction would leave TOUSA "[o]ver-leveraged" and at risk of "crashing
and burning" even if it could successfully execute its de-leveraging plan.
297
Yet, such statements apparently failed to give the lenders much pause.
While there appeared to be information available that would indicate
potential problems with the loan, some critics have assailed the good faith
standard used in TOUSA I as being broad and burdensome. Specifically, one
such critic noted that the most important lesson from the decision is that:
291 [d. at 791.
292 Id. at 851.
293 [d. at 796.
294 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Ketterling (In re Anchorage Marina, Inc.), 93 B.R. 686, 693 (Bankr. D.
N.D. 1988).
295 TOUSA 1, 422 B.R. at 796.
296 Id. at 796-97.
297 [d. at 798 99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
298 Brighton, supra note 13.
2011]
EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL
[L]enders should be on notice that courts may now be examining past
transactions with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight and the reality of the
current economic climate, resulting in the view that the lenders'
actions should be held not only to greater scrutiny, but also to
perhaps a lower standard to impose liability.
299
The decision was also criticized for its finding that Citi's officers should have
realized the severity of the housing market downturn, which effectively would
require the officers to look into a "crystal ball." 300 TOUSA II certainly agreed
with the criticism that TOUSA I inflated lenders' duties to fortune teller
301levels.
Regardless of the debate over duties and due diligence, the question of
whether a lender should have recognized (and acted upon) the likelihood of a
severe downturn in the market is an intensely factual inquiry. TOUSA II
suggested that despite Citi's vast resources and numerous financial analysts, it
lacked the ability to forecast the swift decline of the economy. Perhaps the
missing link was not a crystal ball, but instead a bit of common sense. From
Tulipomania to the Texas oil rush, a bubble's burst is both inevitable and
unexpected. A loan given, with what seemed like reckless indifference to the
viability of the debtor and its subsidiaries as a going concern, suggests that a
lender could choose to ignore the obvious.
The signs pointing towards a harsh decline in the housing market were
documented and began gaining recognition within the industry by early
2006.2 Applying an objective standard, the court opined that the lender
should be expected to take notice of these signs before lending to a struggling
• • •303
company within a rapidly declining industry. Objectively, lenders in housing
and other industries could be on the same notice.
The bankruptcy court opined that a reasonably prudent person in the
transferee's position would have likely reacted to such bleak projections by
conducting a more thorough investigation that may have uncovered the "crash
304and burn" projections by TOUSA's internal management. The court noted
that such an investigation would have also cast doubt over the continuing
299 id.
300 [d. at 72.
30' TOUSA 11, No. 10-60017-CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *50 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).
,o2 TOUSA 1 422 B.R. at 791.
303 [d. at 798.
304 Id. at 799.
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validity of the projections provided to them by TOUSA.305 Regardless of
TOUSA II's attempt to restore order to the lending universe, TOUSA I may still
be a lesson to lenders: earnest and thorough investigation of a borrower's
financial state may reduce the exposure to a charge of negligence (or willful
blindness) in similar transactions. Moreover, lenders should realize that
favorable solvency opinions may not discharge the need for further
investigation. The bankruptcy court viewed the requirement of a solvency
opinion in TOUSA's case as "excessive cleverness, rather than hard-headed,
honest analysis of the economic reality."
30 6
The bankruptcy court would not accept the solvency opinion to be proof of
actual solvency for a number of reasons. Rather than focusing on the
inaccuracy of the opinion, however, the court seemed to imply that the manner
in which Citi requested and followed up with this opinion did not show good
faith because it was merely an attempt by Citi to allow the transaction to move
forward while protecting its own interests with as little true analysis as
possible. 30 7 Another layer of caution to lenders: a mere solvency opinion on its
own will not protect a lender when it would have been reasonable to perform a
deeper analysis in light of the circumstances.
Of course, allegations of bad faith bring corollary allegations of "unclean
hands" on the part of the debtor. A chief criticism of the TOUSA I decision was
that the debtor was not held responsible in any way for its poor decision to
enter into the July 31 Transaction. 308 While the bankruptcy court noted that
"[TOUSA was] dangerously overleveraged," it did not ascribe any culpability
to the borrower for taking on the debt.30 9 The court did not entertain the debate
as to whether the lenders took advantage of the borrower, who likely was a
sophisticated player in the transaction. Therefore, the question presented is
whether in situations such as this, lenders should be penalized because the
borrower, its owners, and its fiduciaries may not have executed good business
judgment.310
o05 Id. at 839-44.
306 [d. at 870 n.56.
3o7 Id. at 839-40.
308 Andrea Saavedra, Legitimate Protection from Parental Abuse or Just Another Blame Game?, WEIL,
GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com!
fiduciary-duties/legitimate-protection-from-parental-abuse-or-just-another-bame-game/.
309 TOUSA 1, 422 BR. at 792.
'10 Saavedra, supra note 308.
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This Article does not attempt to answer that question, but it is one that a
lender and its attorneys must consider. In reality, business owners (whether a
sole proprietorship or global corporation) will generally have a more optimistic
view of their chances of survival:
[D]irectors of [wholly-owned, financially troubled] corporations
could find themselves trapped between Scylla and Charybdis when
facing a decision that may render the subsidiary insolvent or when
making a decision when the subsidiary is potentially already
insolvent. If the directors act in favor of the parent, they risk violating
their fiduciary duties to the subsidiary and its creditors. If the
directors act in favor of the subsidiary and its creditors, they risk
violating their fiduciary duties to their only shareholder, the parent.
Most actions taken in favor of the subsidiary would be protected by
the business judgment rule, as disinterested transactions taken in
good faith, and most actions taken in favor of the subsidiary would be
interested transactions and not be so protected. Thus, the law
currently encourages directors of [wholly-owned, financially
troubled] corporations to question the judgment of its parent and
incur costly transactions costs in its dealings with its parent in an
effort to avoid liability.311
As a result, lenders generally stand in a better position to make an impartial
decision regarding a loan transaction. Lenders should, therefore, be prepared to
shoulder most of the burden. While TOUSA I stops short of reigniting the
flames of the "deepening insolvency" debate, the implied responsibility might
expose lenders to the same vulnerabilities and consequences that led to the
outcome of TOUSA .312 Same results, different means.
B. Validity of Savings Clauses
Although TOUSA II quashed TOUSA I up to the limit of its jurisdiction,
pieces of the TOUSA I decision remain in flux. In dicta, the bankruptcy court
questioned the validity of "savings clauses" in loan documents, possibly
- • 313
reducing their value in financing. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the savings clause was valid for the reason that it protected both
314parties (TOUSA and the lenders). This ruling has been received by the
J. Haskell Murray, "Latchkey Corporations" and their Parents: Fiduciary Duties in Wholly Owned,
Financially Troubled Or Insolvent Subsidiaries (Feb. 2011) (on file with the author).
312 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99, 103 (Del. 2007).
Mark G. Douglas, TOUSA Ruling Bad News for Savings Clauses, JONES DAY (Nov.-Dec. 2009)
http://www.jonesday.com/tousa-ruling-bad-news-for-the-savings-clause- I 1-30-2009/.
314 TOUSA ,422B.R. at 863.
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lending community with a mixture of shock and dismay. 315 The savings clause
portion of TOUSA I is dicta (the bankruptcy court held that TOUSA was
already insolvent prior to the agreement with the clause). Nonetheless it could
be relevant on appeal if the chronology of insolvency becomes an issue.
As a general rule, prebankruptcy contract provisions that waive fraudulent
transfer liability are not effective in bankruptcy. 316 For instance, prebankruptcy
waivers preventing a party from entering bankruptcy are rarely enforced
because they deprive the debtor of an opportunity for a fresh start, one of the
central policy aims of bankruptcy. 317 For example, waivers of the automatic
stay are enforced only sporadically. Some courts decline to enforce them,
318
others consider them as a factor in deciding whether to lift the stay under
§ 362(d),3 19 and still others hold them to be per se enforceable.32 °
Savings clauses can protect debtors and creditors from the vagaries of
bankruptcy. They limit the amount that can be clawed back from a guarantor as
a fraudulent transfer by reducing the contractual obligation to a smaller
amount, which allows the debtor to remain solvent. 32 1 Consider a case in which
a transfer of ten dollars would render the transferor insolvent, thus creating a
fraudulent transaction. Here a savings clause would operate automatically to
reduce the contractual obligation to $9.99. Without the savings clause, the
transaction is vulnerable to claw back.
The TOUSA I holding has garnered particular attention because it
effectively admonished the lenders for playing fast and loose with the
5 Douglas, supra note 313.
316 Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1988).
317 See Fallick v. Kehr (In re Fallick), 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966) ("We agree... that an advance
agreement to waive the benefits of the [Bankruptcy] Act would be void."), Freeman v. Freeman (In re
Freeman), 165 BR. 307, 312 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 1994) ("Provisions in a property settlement agreement that
obligations thereunder are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy are not specifically enforceable and in themselves
are not binding."); Carbia v. Clark (In re Carbia), 113 B.R 761, 763 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 1990) (holding that a
property settlement purporting to render dischargeable a lump sum payment is invalid as against public
policy).
318 See In re Pease, 195 B.R 431,433 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
19 See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shady Grove Tech Ctr. Assocs. (In re Shady Grove Tech Ctr. Assocs.),
227 B.R. 422, 425 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998) ("Waivers of rights are inherently suspect. The party seeking to
enforce [t]he [w]aiver must demonstrate that under the specific facts of the case, the public policy encouraging
workout agreements overcomes the policy in favor of affording the debtor the respite accorded by the
automatic stay in bankruptcy. ")
32o See generally Kupetz, 845 F.2d at 842; see also In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 820 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994).
321 David W. Morse, Legal Issues In Leveraged Acquisitions: From the Lender's Perspective, 1781
PLI/CoRP 325, 382 (2010).
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Bankruptcy Code vis-A-vis a savings clause (even though such provisions are
322
routine in lending contracts). TOUSA I reined in the savings clause
provisions present in each of the first- and second-lien term loan agreements in
the July 31 Transaction. Those clauses provided:
Each Borrower agrees if such Borrower's joint and several liability
hereunder, or if any Liens securing such joint and several liability,
would, but for the agplication of this sentence, be unenforceable
under applicable law, such joint and several liability and each such
Lien shall be valid and enforceable to the maximum extent that
would not cause such joint and several liability or such Lien to be
unenforceable under applicable law, and such joint and several
liability and such Lien shall be deemed to have been automaticallyS 324
amended accordingly at all relevant times.3
The bankruptcy court held that these savings clauses were unenforceable. More
importantly, the court implied that savings clauses might be generally
unenforceable.
3 25
The bankruptcy court examined the savings clauses under contract law and
found them to be unenforceable on two grounds. First, each savings clause
purported to "reduce obligations after accounting for all other obligations."
326
This resulted in a circular problem in which "the value of A can be determined
only after knowing the value of B; but the value of B can be determined only
after knowing the value of A." 327 Because of this interaction between the two
clauses, "liabilities under the term loans are inherently indeterminate," and
therefore unenforceable. 328
Second, in what could best be characterized as passing dicta, the
bankruptcy court went beyond the specific facts of the case and held that the
use of savings clauses to "contract around the core provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code" was invalid. 329 Indeed, bankruptcy courts frown upon
contractual attempts to cut the arms off of the Bankruptcy Code. 330 The
bankruptcy court stated that the reasoning behind § 548 was to "ensure that
322 [d. at 382 83.
323 Here, applicable law is fraudulent transfer law.
324 TOUSA , 422 B.R. 783, 863 n.49 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
325 Id. at 863-65.
326 [d. at 864.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 [d. at 863-64.
'3o See e.g., Waner v. Maxwell (In re Waner Corp.), 146 BR. 973, 976 (Bankr. N.D. 111 1992).
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those who saddle insolvent businesses with new obligations or liens must
provide reasonably equivalent value in return, or face the avoidance of the
transaction. ' ,331 If enforced, the clauses would swallow the portion of
§ 548(a)(1)(B)(1) that wipes clean transfers from insolvent firms that garner
less than reasonably equivalent value.332 The clauses would also nullify the
limits that § 548(c) places on the ability of good faith transferees to retain
property "to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor
in exchange for such transfer or obligation."
333
The bankruptcy court was troubled by the bubble-wrap features of the
savings clauses: they "come into play if and only if the transaction would
otherwise be avoided, i.e., if the transferee has not provided reasonably
equivalent value to an otherwise-insolvent debtor." 334 Thus, even if the
transaction should arrive to the bankruptcy court in a broken condition, the
bubble wrap of a savings clause insulates a lender from liability. For that
reason, the court emphasized that the only purpose that a savings clause serves
"is to ensure that the transferee can preserve its claim to every last penny of the
debtor's remaining assets without providing reasonably equivalent value," to
the detriment of other creditors in the case. 335 Based on this, the bankruptcy
court concluded that "the savings clauses are a frontal attack on the protections
that [§] 548 provides to other creditors," and they were "entirely too cute to be
enforced.3 36
In an amicus brief filed in the TOUSA I appeals, the Loan Syndications and
Trading Association ("LSTA") argued that the court's decision has the
potential to affect the way lenders do business going forward. 337 This
pessimism over a TOUSA-effect on credit markets is a shared attitude:
"Lenders unable to rely on savings clauses to minimize avoidance exposure
may be reluctant to extend credit in a market that is already tight." 338 Despite
the doomsday scenarios, credit is hard to come by regardless of anything a
331 TOUSA 1,422BR. at864.
i32 Id.
333 [id.
334 id.
335 id.
336 id.
337 See Brief for Loan Syndications and Trading Association as Arnicus Curiae, TOUSA H, No. 10-60017-
CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008 (SD. Fla. 2011) ("Penalizing the Lenders here will only hurt other commercial
borrowers who seek rescue financing because the lenders in such situations
will need to price their loans to reflect the risk of being re-cast as guarantors-or worse, refuse to
provide rescue financing altogether."); see also Douglas, supra note 313.
338 Douglas, supra note 313, at 4-5.
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bankruptcy court in Florida says. It is plausible that lenders likely will insist
upon alternative forms of credit enhancement to supplant upstream guarantees
infested with savings clauses.339 As one commentator noted, "[n]one of these
ideas are as attractive as the 'magic bullet' of a savings clause-but the
[TOUSA] court, at least, doesn't believe in magic." 340 This could be
discouraging news for companies currently struggling to line up debtor-in-
possession financing in order to restructure or reorganize their businesses.
34
'
C. Lender Liabilityfor Diminution in Lien Value
One last interesting conclusion deserves further mention. In TOUSA I, the
bankruptcy court held that "[tihe Conveying Subsidiaries [were] also entitled
to recover the diminution in value of the liens that [had] occurred since the
transfer., 342 The court's holding relied on § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which permits recovery for the benefit of the estate of "the property
transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property .... 343 Courts
"have consistently held that [this section] 'is designed to restore the estate to
the financial condition that would have existed had the transfer never
occurred.' 344 The bankruptcy court reasoned that because the liens had
diminished in value, the Conveying Subsidiaries could only be returned to their
original position by collecting the difference as well as avoiding the liens.
345
In order to provide support for its position, the bankruptcy court relied on
In re American Way Service Corp.,346 in which transferred property had
declined in value and the estate was entitled to receive the entire value at the
time of the transfer.347 TOUSA I cited no cases in which the transferee was
liable for the diminished value of an avoided lien rather than recovered
tangible property.348 The lack of published opinions or other decisional
authority could make this issue a focus on appeal.
349
"~id
340 John C. Weitnauer, TOUSA and Its Consequences, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING:
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING MARKETS AND UNCERTAIN TIMES 1507, 1515 (2010).
341 See Douglas, snpra note 313.
342 TOUSA [, 422 BR. at 883.
4 Id. at 881 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2006)).
344 [d. (quoting Bakst v. Wetzel (In re Kingsley), 518 F.3d 874, 877 (11 th Cir. 2008)).
345 Id. at 885.
346 [d. at 883.
347 See Feltman v. Warmus (In re Am. Way Serv. Corp), 229 BR. 496, 530-32 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
341 Id. at 531-33
349 See Senior Transeastern Lenders' Post-Trial Memorandum at 8 14, TOUSA 1, 422 B.R at 783 (No.
08-10928-JKO).
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In the post-trial memorandum, the defendants argued that "[c]ourts
recognize that avoidance and recovery are distinct concepts . . . . Indeed,
recovery is only available when avoidance alone is inadequate." 350 This is an
accurate statement, and remedies available to a debtor or trustee may be
limited based on the property interest that has been transferred, 351 but this is a
conclusion at which bankruptcy courts arrive based on the facts presented by
the case, including whether there are accessible assets to support recovery in
addition to avoidance. It need not be an either/or proposition.352 Bankruptcy
courts have held that when the interest transferred is a non-possessory interest
such as a lien, the only remedy available is avoidance and "no recovery is
possible under § 550."353 In fact, the concept of recovery itself conveys the
notion that a possessory interest in property exists.354 This is because when a
non-possessory interest in property is avoided, nothing remains to be
recovered.355
Two recent decisions by the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
denied recovery following an avoided mortgage. 356 The Tenth Circuit held that
"[w]here .. . the [t]rustee avoids only a non-possessory transfer of a lien
interest, the preservation of that lien interest for the benefit of the estate is
sufficient to place the estate in exactly the same position it would have been in,
but for the granting of the lien." 357 Allowing recovery of the diminution in
value "appears to assume that, had the voidable transfer not been made,
the . . . collateral would not have depreciated in value." 358 Other courts
"throughout the country have reached the same conclusion.'
359
The defendants argued that in addition to going outside the purpose of
§ 550, the court would also violate the single-satisfaction limitation inherent in
SId. at 8 (citation omitted).
Sid
352 See Gabel & Redmond, supra note 113, at 91 92.
353 Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 349, at 9 (quoting Yoppolo v. Liberty Mortg. (In re Morgan), 276
BR. 785, 792 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001)).
'54 Id. (citing In re Morgan, 276 B.R at 792).
355 i.
356 See Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 349, at 9 11 see also Rodriguez v. DaimlerChrysler Fin.
Servs. Ams. LLC (In re Bremer), 408 BR. 355 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) (consolidating two lower court
decisions on appeal: Rodriguez v. DaimlerChtysler Fin. Servs. Ars. (In re Bremer), 392 B.R 873 875 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 2008), and Rodriquez v. Drive Fin. Servs. LP (In re Trout), 392 BR. 869 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008)).
157 Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 349, at 10; see also In re Bremer, 408 B.R at 358 (citing In re
Trout, 392 BR. at 871 and In re Bremer, 392 BR. at 875).
'58 Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 349, at 10; see also In re Bremer, 392 BR. at 875 n.3 In re
Trout, 392 BR. at 872 n.3.
'59 Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 349, at 11-12.
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§ 550(d) by permitting recovery after avoidance of a lien. 36 As detailed above,
this is permissible in bankruptcy-depending upon, of course, the facts of the
case. 361 In the 2008 case of In re Sickels, the court concluded that "[a]voidance
of a lien constitutes a complete recovery for the bankruptcy estate. . . .By
avoiding the lien, the bankruptcy estate now holds the property ... just as the
[d]ebtors did prior to granting the [lien]." 362 As a result, if the trustee were also
awarded a judgment in the amount of the loan, the trustee would collect twice
on the avoided lien.
363
In TOUSA, however, there were multiple transfers that precipitated one
complex macro-transaction, borne of both liens and payments. 364 It is difficult
(but not impossible) to claw back the whole pie in this case. TOUSA I gave
back the whole pie, and received a staunch reprimand for doing so. In some
ways, TOUSA I reached the equitable result while TOUSA II reached the legal
result. Nonetheless, both courts demonstrate some flawed reasoning in
reaching their results. The defendants further argued that the debtors continued
to have access and use of their assets after granting non-possessory liens to the
New Lenders. 365 Strictly avoiding the liens as fraudulent transfers would have
restored the debtors to their pre-transfer position. In addition, the majority of
relevant case law appears to preclude recovery beyond the avoidance of the
liens.
CONCLUSION
The TOUSA I and I opinions give bankruptcy practitioners and scholars a
large amount of material to digest. It may be argued that the analyses of either
TOUSA I or TOUSA II are flawed in reason, but one would be hard pressed to
demonstrate a lack of meticulous detail in either opinion. Both opinions
attempt the laudable goal of correcting a perceived wrong, but the two courts'
takes on fraudulent transfer analysis will no doubt be the primary issue before
the Eleventh Circuit. The district court's opinion evokes a "belly of the beast"
model where the analysis must start and finish at the hub of the corporate
group and the benefits that flow from it. On the other hand, the bankruptcy
360 [d. at 12-4.
36l See Gabel & Redmond, supra note 118, at 91-92.
362 Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 349, at 13 (quoting Schnittjer v. Linn Area Credit Union (In re
Sickels), 392 B.R. 423, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008)).
i d.
364 See id. at l1 14.
365 Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 349, at 14.
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court focused on the extremities and whether damaged appendages (bankrupt
subsidiaries) would handicap the corporate body beyond repair.
From precedence to dicta, TOUSA's reach cuts a wide path beyond the pure
bankruptcy issues of fraudulent transfer methodology. For example, in the
context of expert witnesses, the court determined that the presence of a conflict
renders the opinion inadequate and unreliable. 366 When there is a bonus paid to
arrive at a particular answer, the expert's credibility is compromised if not
367destroyed. TOUSA I is unwavering in its conclusion that a reliable opinion
must be based on reliable methodology from a reliable expert, 36  but the
surrounding facts seem to dilute what would otherwise be a strict adherence to
Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.369
At a more macro level, the implication that TOUSA has turned distressed
lending inside out is at least a mild exaggeration. 37  Even critics agree that
"[t]he court's finding that upstream guarant[ees] provided by [wholly-owned]
subsidiaries were fraudulent transfers is not all that surprising." 37 1 Because
upstream guarantees do not give direct consideration to the subsidiary
providing the guarantee, a common outcome is a finding that the subsidiary did
not receive reasonably equivalent value in the transaction. 372 The most
apparent cause of angst among secured lenders is that liens securing $500
million in bank loans were avoided in TOUSA I. Such an outcome is the source
of a lender's worst nightmare.
373
Nonetheless, the disastrous impact of TOUSA I may be nothing more than a
red herring, and any true effects have yet to be revealed beyond the instant
366 John C. Weitnauer, Valuation Questions Raisedby TOUSA, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2010, at 38, 39.
367 Id
368 Id. at 39, 76.
369 In TOUSA If, the district court found it suspect that while the bankruptcy court rebuked the
defendants' financial expert, one of the Committee's experts (who testified at great length) "was not licensed
or certified as an appraiser or expert in real estate valuation in any state." TOUSA II, No. 10-60017-
CIV/GOLD, 2011 WL 522008, at *17 n. 37 (SD. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011). The contingency bonus paid to the
defendants' expert drew the bankruptcy court's ire, but the potential lack of qualifications by the Committee's
expert seemed to receive a free pass. Objectivity and threshold qualifications are related concepts and it seems
that the results (from a theoretical standpoint) should be the same for both experts. Either exclude both or
admit both and let the testimony and challenges go toward the weight as opposed to the admissibility of the
opinions.
370 See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 313.
371 Brighton, supra note 13, at 72.
372 id
373 Douglas E. Deutsch & Meghan Towers, Top Business Bankruptcy Cases of 2009, AM. BANKR. INST.
J.,Mar. 2009, at40, 41.
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case. Before TOUSA II, only a scant number of cases cited TOUSA I and not
for any of its more controversial holdings. 374 Prior to TOUSA I, lenders often
included savings clauses in the applicable loan documents. 375 Without the use
of savings clauses as a safety net for exposure to fraudulent transfers, lenders
may impose tighter standards and require alternative assurances to extend
credit in the current market.376 On the other hand, the tight credit market may
make any TOUSA-related lender apprehension a nullity given the general
reluctance to lend in the current economy.
The overall effect of TOUSA I and I may, however, be limited to
macroeconomic lending situations involving distressed companies. In the
current financial climate, the "distressed" label is not an uncommon one. For
these companies, liquidity remains elusive, and access to cash or credit comes
with numerous restrictions. Whether similarly restrictive loan structures will
permeate otherwise normal lending practices remains uncertain. But that
consequence is more likely to be catalyzed by the impending financial reform
rather than the TOUSA opinions.
Beyond loan structures and expert opinions, this decision may also affect
the manner in which lenders perform due diligence in preparation for loan
,. 377
transactions. Solvency opinions should be prepared by independent
consultants to replace management projections that may no longer be trusted as
reliable.378 At the least, it now seems incumbent upon lenders to perform
rigorous reviews of guarantors' financial conditions. Various scenarios must be
considered, the most important of which is perhaps whether the guarantee
would render the entity insolvent. To ameliorate the specter of TOUSA, lenders
may implement caps on liability.379 In any event, this decision-whether
upheld or reversed-will continue to reverberate in both the lender and debtor
arenas.
While it was predictable that TOUSA I would receive a haircut on appeal,
Judge Gold's decision to buzz it bald with a chainsaw seems extreme in light
of the extensive factual record and applicable law. To quash and gut the
374 See Rodriguez v. Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. (In re Trout), 609 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2010); Hagan v.
Goldstein (In re Goldstein), 428 B.R. 733, 736 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010).
3 TOUSA , TOUSA 1, 422 BR. 783, 863 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009)..
376 Douglas, supra note 313.
'77 Brighton, supra note 13, at 73.
378 id
379 Steven G. Horowitz, Current Issues for Commercial Real Estate Lenders, in COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING MARKETS AND UNCERTAIN TIMES 157, 162 (2010).
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opinion may invite (unnecessarily) inconsistent determinations of solvency,
reasonably equivalent value, and good faith within complex bankruptcy cases.
By releasing institutional lenders from the standard of objective good faith and
due diligence when they act contrary to the long term interests of the market
and the companies to which they lend, TOUSA II might encourage a return to
the laissez-faire lending practices at the root of so many bubbles. Regardless,
the case brings buckets of issues from the well of corporate self-destruction. In
a decade hardly starved for complicated issues in bankruptcy, the Eleventh
Circuit may find TOUSA an unwelcome feast. At bare minimum, the ongoing
TOUSA appellate saga is a plate of plenty.

